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THE MISCEGENETIC UNION OF LIABILITY
INSURANCE AND TORT PROCESS IN THE
PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS SYSTEM*
Allen E. Smithf
I
THE PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS SYSTEM AND SocIAL GoALs
Liability insurance is a pervasive fact of contemporary Amer-
ican life which increasingly has become associated with almost all our
social ills. And we are kept aware of its existence and its problems by
the constant coverage of the mass media. Although not proven
definitely, it seems eminently safe to assume (1) that most people liv-
ing in the United States think that if a person wants to insure against
liability from risky conduct, he can do so, and (2) that most jurors,
claimants' attorneys, and judges assume that the defendant in a given
personal injury lawsuit is covered by insurance.1 Put another way,
our society assumes that most personal injury claims are paid or will
Copyright @ 1969 by Allen E. Smith. All rights reserved.
t Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law, visiting Associate Professor
of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1960, LL.B. 1961, University of Texas.
I The following discussion is limited to consideration of the system which we have
for dealing with claims for damages resulting from personal injuries. For the most part
the principles of the tort process are the same for personal injury and property damage,
but addition of the relationship of liability insurance makes treatment of the two kinds
of claims somewhat different. Most of what is said here may apply as well to either
kind of interest, but each deserves its own consideration and discussion. Nor does this
diussion purport to cover the full range of sources of reparations, including Blue Cross-
Blue Shield, cooperative group health plans, hospitalization and disability insurance,
Social Security, military disability systems, medicare, welfare plans, or non-occupational
and occupational disability systems, all of which surely are a part of the personal
injury claims system in any realistic sense.
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be paid by an insurance company. Even though few among us under-
stand the liability insurance business, its goals, or its problems, 2
when it happens that an insurance company does not pay, for what-
ever reason, our usual reaction is frustration and anger. In short, we
have entrenched liability insurance firmly in our national attitude
toward personal injury claims.
The relationship of liability insurance and the tort process is diffi-
cult to characterize in -a pithy phrase. Biological metaphors spring to
mind. Has the union produced a hybrid? Is it a symbiotic relation-
ship? Or is insurance simply a harmful parasite? For reasons discussed
more fully in the following pages, a "miscegenetic union"-like that
of fish and fowl-incapable of producing social welfare as its offspring,
seems most apt as a shorthand description.
When we consider the significance of the miscegenetic union
for social life, we find that although lawyers and judges recognize the
close relationship of liability insurance and the tort process, they have
not considered and are not aware of the full implications of the rela-
tionship. If its importance is realized, it is not stressed; remarkably
little has been written on the subject. It is common, even for those of
us who know better, to continue to talk of "tort law" as if the pro-
cess to which personal injury claims were subjected in the nineteenth
century still were in effect.3 Our analysis of our claims system follows
a bifurcated path. On the one hand we examine the tort process, 4
and on the other we examine the liability insurance institution.
When we consider proposals for reform in the one or the other we
rarely ask how changes in the one will affect the other. The presumed
"goals of tort law" are the standards by which we judge what hap-
pens to claims today.
2 Unless a legislator is "himself an attorney or in the insurance business, he may
find himself without even the most basic understanding of how the existing system
works. And he is not alone .... " Dukakis, Legislators Look at Proposed Changes, in
CRisis IN CAR INSURANCE 222, 230 (R. Keeton, J. O'Connell & J. McCord eds. 1968) [here-
inafter the references to this collection of essays is cited as Cpsis]. Currently a major
insurer advertises on television that "all you need to know about insurance is the
name of our company."
3 This probably is the product of the traditional law school approach to the subject.
Cf. T. ISON, THE FoRENsic Lorn.RY 214-15 (1967).
4 The Automobile Reparations Committee of the American Bar Association presently
is studying automobile accident claims systems. Its study outline in connection with pro-
posals for improvement of the "Present Total System" recognizes that liability insurance
exists to the extent of providing a solvent defendant and recognizes the need for a few
basic improvements in liability insurance, but the total relationship of tort process and
insurance is on the whole ignored. Committee letter "To All Interested Parties, July 8,
1968 and Outline of Study."
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Most of us fail to recognize that liability insurance and the tort
process have combined to produce a unique system, which for better
or worse is greater than the sum of its parts. In practice the tort pro-
cess and liability insurance function as a unit,5 and it is the unit, not
its individual components, which we must examine and understand.6
There are several important reasons for recognizing that it is not
tort law alone that controls the disposition of personal injury claims.
One of these is simply to be realistic with ourselves. Another reason is
that an understanding of the existing tort process will help us to
evaluate its progress in achieving "social goals." This understanding
is essential if we want to do a good job of reform. It is particularly
important for us to be sufficiently sensitive to discover whether some
of the cherished assumptions of the tort process and of the insurance
institution hold true under a combined system. For example, as we
shall see, the assumption that a litigant can and will be represented
by counsel who will give him his full fidelity and allegiance is not
true of many insured defendants under the existing system. If many
assumptions as important to us as the relationship of attorney and
client are violated, we probably will want to consider some alterations
in the system.7 Still another reason for keeping our systems straight is
to recognize costs of all kinds. Operating the court system always is
expensive for taxpayers and litigants; it also can be expensive to
payers of insurance premiums. Ultimately, all of our society is con-
cerned in some way, for many losses that are not shifted by the sys-
tem frequently are shifted to others in more haphazard ways, such as
public welfare costs, the costs of crime, lowered productivity, lowered
consumption, and the other social effects that can grow out of un-
5 See Gardner, Insurance Against Tort Liability-An Approach to the Cosmology of
the Law, 15 LAw & CONE!wN. PROB. 455, 464 (1950). Kimball, Automobile Accident
Compensation Systems, in Ciusis 10, 12, refers to the system as the "tort-liability-liability
insurance system!'
6 One question which might be raised is whether our claims system is even a "legal"
one. The combination with liability insurance, which is motivated almost wholly by the
desire for increased profits, may have converted the system, notwithstanding its use of
rules, to a model of the laissez-faire market in which a bargaining process determines
results.
7 Professor Kalven seems to miss the importance of the assumptions of our claims
system when he suggests that the current controversy regarding problems of automobile
accident reparations inappropriately mixes "a series of popular issues about auto
insurance with what had been the traditional problems of tort law in the auto com-
pensation area." Kalven, A Schema of Alternatives to the Present Auto Accident Tort
System, 1 CoNN. L. Rlv. 33 (1968). To the extent that our system assumes that liability
insurance is available to the public, the system necessarily is disrupted by the "popular
issue" regarding cancellation and non-renewal of insurance. The mixture of issues is not
the product of mental lapse but of the union of liability insurance and the tort process.
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tended injury. Examination of the combined system also may reveal
whether it is in fact possible that the two components are capable of
achieving society's goals in combination. Perhaps neither component
can survive the union in its traditional form, and if the union is to
be preserved society may have to alter both.
It was suggested above that we tend to evaluate our claims system
in light of what we consider the "goals of tort law." It is important
for us to understand at the outset the part that social goals or objec-
tives play in analyzing the claims system. By goals I mean calculated
policy decisions that given results are socially desirable. When the pol-
icymaking process has produced goals, new systems presumably can
be devised and old systems modified to achieve them. But if we have
not decided on our goals, or if we simply do not know what they are,
students of our claims system are relegated to mere observation of
interesting facts, and evaluation is limited to registry of subjective
approval or disapproval. In such circumstances, use of the term "goals"
necessarily refers only to rationalizations of the existing system in
terms of its observed effects. For example, if it should be observed that
tort rules seem to deter dangerous conduct, it might be said that
deterrence is a goal of tort law.8
Since claims systems usually are evaluated in relation to the
way in which they achieve goals, the relevance of the distinction
between the use of the term to signify policy objectives and its use
to rationalize the status quo is apparent. It is particularly relevant
because there has been so much confusion of policy and apology in
use of the terms. For example, the "goals" of the liability insurance
component of our system, in the sense of policy decisions, have been
left almost entirely in private hands to be formulated for private in-
terest. To those who operate the business, its only goal is to make
money.9 Statements regarding other goals, such as "providing a solvent
defendant," or "spreading losses," or "protecting the insured from
liability," simply change to "goals" effects that it is thought insurance
produces, or that it would be desirable if it produced.' 0 In fact,
8 For another example, Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money, and the
Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 1, 37
(1961), say that their data "provide insights into whether the present rules perform
as they were meant to."
9 See Workshop Sessions: Summary Report, in Ciss 259 [hereinafter cited as
Workshop]; Mann, Remarks, id. at 113. Insurers naturally prefer to avoid payment of
claims altogether if they can.
10 It is easy to confuse situations and needs of which insurers have taken advantage
with their purposes in doing so. For example, Professor James says that, "Liability in-
surance was invented to meet the needs of employers who were faced with increasing
[Vol. 54:645
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however, our society has not yet adopted policy goals for liability in-
surance. Even if the mentioned effects were in fact our policy goals,
they might be found to be mutually inconsistent with insurers' pri-
vate goals of higher profits.'1 It is interesting to speculate about what
would-happen to our claims system if action to effectuate deliberate
policy goals should be taken and insurers should decide to withdraw
from the field.
To the extent that the tort process has conscious policy goals, 12
they are quasi-public, largely inarticulate (e.g., "compensation for
harm"), and at times inconsistent.'3 It would be disingenuous to
suggest and naive to believe that many of the rules of the tort pro-
cess were deliberately designed to achieve pre-determined social goals.
Like all human creations, the rules have been created for a variety
of reasons. For some rules there seemed at the time to be good rea-
sons, reasons which may or may not now exist. Some were designed
solely to protect the narrow interests of a few. Others were products
of accident or irrationality. For the most part the history of tort rules
in personal injury cases has been one of regression from the early
strict liability law of trespass and trespass on the case, fashioned piece-
meal by lobbyists in the courts. In short, like liability insurance, when
the tort process has accomplished public good it has more often been
its effect rather than its purpose.
One conclusion that might follow from recognition of the vir-
tual absence from our claims system of conscious policy goals as
statutory liability for industrial accidents .... " James, History of the Law Governing
Recovery in Automobile Accident Cases, 14 U. FLA. L. RFv. 321, 324 (1962). In fact, of
course, it was invented for the profit of insurers, who simply took advantage of the need.
11 See Workshop, supra note 9, at 259.
12 The system which consists in part of the tort process, with its widespread net-
work of substantive rules and complex procedures designed to implement them, can be
viewed as having one primary function: the shifting of some losses from an injured
person to some other person or group. This is not a self-justifying objective. Whether it
shifts losses in order to achieve goals or whether its operation merely results in a net
social gain or loss is another question.
13 Professor Ison points out that a primary defect of negligence liability is that
"just compensation for the plaintiff and just condemnation of the defendant are
mutually exclusive objectives." ISON, supra note 3, at 14. Professor Calabresi correctly
observes that in such a case the system must be evaluated in terms of its ability to max-
imize achievement of several social goals, even though they are inconsistent with each
other to some extent. Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum
and Kalven, 75 YAiE L.J. 216, 220-24 (1965). .
For some representative statements of "the goals" of a system, see ISON, supra, at 7
(prevention; medical care and rehabilitation; income security; fair allocation of costs),
and id. at 55-56; R. KEETON &c J. O'CONNELL, BAsra PROTEarnoN FOR Tm TRAFIC VICrM
241-72 (1965) [hereinafter cited as KEON & O'CONNELL]; Calabresi, supra, at 238; Co-
nard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 Mios . L. Rv. 279, 326 (1964).
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opposed to salutary effects is that it is impossible to evaluate the
existing system or any other by any but subjective criteria. This prob-
ably is too extreme, although it is well to recognize that the system
has no mechanism for achieving consensus regarding goals and that
most published statements of goals represent only the policy choices
of the writer. However, for purposes of the following consideration
of our claims system, sensitivity to the limitations of analysis in
terms of goals should be helpful. For one thing, we should recognize
that we know little about the desirability of various goals or of the
possibility of their achievement. Nor can we be confident that we
have considered the full range of goals.14 Most importantly for our
purposes, we cannot fail to see that our evaluation of our existing
system or any other must necessarily be tentative and imprecise in
the absence of definite standards. Although I would not suggest that
we throw up our hands, we should be aware that our evaluation is
based on a combination of subjective preference and guessed-at con-
sensus regarding desirable social goals. For this reason I have not
undertaken to compare the system that is described with other pos-
sible systems. For the moment understanding what we have may be
more important. 5
II
Tim LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPONENT OF THE PERSONAL INJURY
CLAIMS SYSTEM
In order to appreciate subsequent sections, some understanding
of the liability insurance business and of the relationship of insurer
14 Cf. Conard, supra note 13, at 282-84.
15 It was recently observed that there are two major trends in personal injury
compensation: the development of negligence doctrine and the development of new
methods of compensation which threaten negligence. IsoN, supra note 3, at 5-6. Certainly
the majority of recent proposals for reform of the existing system fall in the latter cate-
gory, although it is not really negligence law but the system-the combination of negli-
gence law and tort procedure with liability insurance-which necessarily is the focal
point of attack. Although it is not possible to review these proposals here, it is germane
to this discussion to refer to a certain ambivalence or inconsistency in many of them.
On the one hand, their authors are sensitive to weaknesses of the present system in
relation to supposedly desirable social goals, and to the relationship of liability insurance
to many such weaknesses. Yet at the same time some of them seem not to be troubled by
preserving the present system as part of their proposals. See generally KEaTON &
O'CONNELL, at 124-89, 299-482. One of my purposes in the following pages will be
to present facts from which the wisdom of doing so can be judged. These facts seem
to raise the question whether the effects of the union of liability insurance with the
tort process have been fully recognized. For a report on each of the automobile com-
pensation plans advanced to date and a comparison of their provisions, see King, The
Insurance Industry and Compensation Plans, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 1137 (1968).
[Vol. 54:645
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to insured is essential, although it will not be necessary to do more
than sketch the outline. A basic familiarity with the tort process is
assumed. 6
With these limitations in mind, looked at quite narrowly, liabil-
ity insurance is simply a private exchange of mutually advantageous
promises: the insured promises to pay the insurer a premium, and
the insurer promises to discharge legal liability that might be im-
posed on the insured as a result of certain occurrences. "Accident"
insurance, in comparison, is payable to the insured upon the occur-
rence of a specified event without regard to legal responsibility for it.
The narrow view is too narrow, of course, for it is clear that the pub-
lic has an interest in this relationship and its social consequences.
For the moment, however, it is enough to focus on the small picture.
The "policy" of insurance is the written expression of the con-
tractual obligations of the parties, although a considerable gloss of
case law has been added to many of its terms. Naturally the col-
lection of premiums is of central concern to the insurer, whose prin-
cipal object is the amassing of profits. The insurer's initial or organi-
zation capital is obtained from the same sources as those drawn upon
by other businesses. Thereafter, as insurance contracts are sold by
salesmen or "agents" in the field, cash receipts from premiums begin
to accumulate. Particularly because most states regulate some of the
financial aspects of the insurance industry, specific funds to provide
for claims that may be made under the policies commonly must be
established and maintained or conservatively invested;17 other funds
are allocated to unearned premium accounts and to operating ex-
penses. All funds that are not required to be maintained in cash are
invested in income-producing activities and properties. It is invest-
ment income that primarily fulfills the profitmaking objective of
liability insurers. Premiums provide the funds for investment.' 8
16 For more complete current treatment of the organization of the insurance in-
dustry, of its regulation, and of the ratemaking process, see King, supra note 15, at
1147-69.
17 Loss reserves frequently are established on the basis of full estimated or
"incurred losses" even before a particular claim is investigated. A. LEviN & E. WooLLEY,
DxssATCa AND DELAY 398 (1961). To err on the high side increases both non-taxable
liabilities and the amount which can be invested without discovery of produced income.
18 Whether or not liability insurers find their enterprises profitable currently is
a matter of some dispute, although frankly -much of the dispute seems spurious. The
subject does deserve further consideration; but unfortunately limitations of space pre-
clude full discussion here. It is important to recognize that there is no standard termi-
nology for insurance company accounting. And this fact enables insurers to insist to
some that they are operating at a loss while showing handsome profits to most others.
According to a congressional subcommittee report, automobile insurers claimed "under-
writing" losses of 301 million dollars in 1965, and of 1.67 billion dollars for the 1956-
1969]
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Although premium rates as a whole have risen sharply in recent
years, because the insurance industry is highly competitive, premium
charges vary only slightly from insurer to insurer for the same kind
of policy. Moreover, insurance premium rates are often established by
state authorities as an exercise of their general regulatory powers. As
it works out, competition provides the rate ceiling and regulation
usually provides the floor.19 The method by which the rate is estab-
lished varies from state to state, but where rates are subject to regula-
tion it often is based upon some notion of a fair return to the in-
vestor-the same kind of formula employed to determine the rates
charged by public utilities that are given monopoly positions by the
1966 decade. ANTITRUST SuacoMM. OF THE HOUSE Commvf. ON THE JUDICIRY, AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE STUDY, H.R. REP. No. 815, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 59 (1967). The basis for this
claim becomes clearer when it is understood that insurers adamantly refuse to consider
investment income in connection with underwriting experience, and do everything
possible to obscure their true financial pictures. See Ames, The Automobile Accident
Commission Proposal: An Irrational Concept, 14 U. FrA. L. REv. 898, 414-16 (1962);
Maidenberg, Remarks, in CaisI 252, 253. This is accomplished in part by using two sets
of books, one for insurance regulatory bodies and taxing authorities, and another for
stockholders. Another technique is the illegitimate combination of the cash method of
accounting for expenses (see the preceding note) and the accrual method for income,
thus reflecting continuing losses in periods of increasing premium volume. Wilson,
How to Get Rich While Losing Money, TRLAL LAwYERS F. 11 (May-June 1967). Profits
are hidden in policy surplus and reserve funds. Ames, supra, at 419-81. Moreover, some
normal expense items, such as attorneys' fees, are charged to underwriting losses even
in connection with successfully resisted claims. R. IVISTON, Hir FROM Born Snas 88
(1967). Another such questionable item is the "good will" settlement expense, which
is not a "loss" because it is not a legal liability of the insured. According to an industry
organ, a recent "professional study" showed only a 4.4% rate of return for property and
liability insurance, even when investment income and earnings on reserves were included.
Insurance Prices and Profits, 29 J. INs. INFORMATION 21 (Mar.-Apr. 1968).
These practices have not wholly escaped the scrutiny of the courts (see Wilson,
supra, at 28), or of the commentators. See generally LEwzsTON, supra, at 158-59, 162-64,
171-76; Birkinsha, Investment Income and Underwriting Profit: "And Never the Twain
Shall Meet'?, 8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 718 (1967); Norgaard & Shick, Auto Insurance is
Profitable, TRIAL 24 (Oct.-Nov. 1968); Sharp, Remarks, in CRsisS 256; 58 TExAS OBSERVER,
Dec. 80, 1968, at 1-5, 18; The Business With 103 Million Unsatisfied Customers, TIME,
Jan. 26, 1968, at 20.
A study commissioned by a congressional committee showed that insurers earn
greater "risk adjusted rates of profit" than 90% of U.S. businesses, defining "risk
adjusted rate of profit" as the "average annual return including interest, dividends and
security appreciation that the suppliers of capital receive, divided by the initial market
value of all the firm's securities" over a period of fifteen years, and defining "risk"
as "the variability of the rate of profit over. the period" of the study. Congressional Study,
TRIAL 46 (Aug.-Sept. 1968).
19 See Conard, supra note 18, at 817 n.126. The rate established by regulation is
not always the lowest rate actually charged. If large and efficient companies can obtain
rate increases on the basis of the needs of the marginal companies they can present the
appearance of a bargain by charging a rate lower than that permitted by the regulations.
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state. Oddly enough, however, investment income usually is not con-
sidered in determining rates.20 For this reason, insofar as the amount
of profit is dependent upon the premium rate, the factors employed
in the formula used to determine a fair rate of return and for making
and adjusting rates are of considerable importance. In particular, it
is important to know the percentage of the premium dollar that
actually is used to pay policy claims.
Theoretically, if insurers could be assured of a fixed margin of
profit beyond expenses and payouts on behalf of insureds, they should
not be disturbed by the total amount of claims payouts; the important
thing would be to ensure that the amount did not exceed the premi-
um-setting formula's "loss ratio"-the ratio of losses paid to premiums
brought in within a given period. However, like most other busi-
nesses, insurers want more than a fixed minimum profit. They want
to increase both the profits that result from gross increases in premi-
um dollars and the amount of each premium dollar that can be in-
vested and that can itself yield profits. Thus the premium rate is
of primary importance throughout the industry, and intense efforts
are directed toward producing rate increases. These efforts are aimed
at winning public acceptance of the need for a higher rate, and, where
necessary, at obtaining legislative and administrative authorization
for higher rates. There is also strong and continuing pressure for
total abolition of rate regulation. Not surprisingly, industry pleas for
higher rates or abolition of regulation often are based on presenta-
tion of a rather bleak picture of the health of the tort process, which
in turn presents a bleak loss-ratio picture to enlist the sympathies
of the public and of rate-making bodies.21
The amassing of profit for investment requires, in addition to
high premium rates, minimal claims payouts. For accomplishing this
purpose every insurance company has a claims department or division,
usually headed by a manager who may be assisted by claims attorneys
20 See note 18 supra.
21 The rate-making process is not nearly as certain as its use of formulae would
suggest. For some understanding of the process see Bailey, Remarks, in Casis 197; Cabbe,
Rate Making and Rate Litigation, 16 FEO'N INS. COUNSE.L 67 (Spring 1966); Harwayne,
Insurance Costs of Basic Protection Plan in Michigan, in Cisis 119; McNamara, Auto-
mobile Liability Insurance Rates, 25 INs. COUNSEL J.'398 (1966); Rose, State Regulation
of Property and Casualty Insurance Rates, 28 OHio ST. L.J. 669 (1967); Spencer, A Com-
parative Economic Analysis of the Current Rate Regulation Laws, 1968 INS. LJ. 369;
S. REP. No. 831, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). Its complexities recently have been studied
by the federal government with a possible view toward federal regulation.
It is a frequent claim of insurers that they are powerless to reduce premiums, due
to general inflationary increases and in particular to the present legal system and the
costs of litigation. Workshop, supra note 9, at 261.
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and claims adjusters, as well as by independent claims adjusters
and inter-company claims adjustment bureaus. The task of the claims
department is to keep the premium-loss ratio below or at a level
with the ratio upon which the existing premium rates were estab-
lished. To understand fully how this can be done, it is necessary
to consider the nature of the insurer's obligations under a liability
policy.
The provisions of most liability insurance policies have been
carefully developed by one or the other of the two national associ-
ations of which almost all liability insurers are members-the In-
surance Rating Board and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau.
Although only a few states actually prescribe the terms of liability
policies, insurers find that substantial uniformity is in their interest.
Most liability policies, including those insuring the owners and oper-
ators of automobiles, have come to include two principal promises
by the insurer which have been particularly significant in the develop-
ment of our personal injury claims system. First, the insurer promises
to pay on behalf of an insured person "all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay" as a result of the occurrence
of certain specified risks, up to the monetary limits specified in the
policy. Second, the insurer promises "to defend any suit against the
insured" in which it is asserted by the plaintiff that the insured is
legally obligated to pay him damages by virtue of the occurrence of
a covered risk (usually the insurer obligates itself to defend even
groundless suits of this nature), and to pay all costs of suit and in-
vestigation.22 Both promises are conditioned on timely notice of a
claim, on cooperation by the insured person with the insurer, and
on the absence of action by the insured that prejudices the subro-
gation rights of the insurer. Automobile liability protection usually
focuses upon operation of a particular vehicle while driven by a mem-
ber of a defined class of persons, or on some other particularized
operation, but there are general liability policies as well.23
These two provisions have dual significance. The first promise
limits the obligation of the insurer to make payment to those cases
in which the insured would himself be "legally obligated" to make
payment; that is, with respect to a tort action, to those cases in which
22 See generally Comment, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Under a Liability Insur-
ance Policy, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 734 (1966).
23 A new "comprehensive general liability insurance policy" went into general use
in most states in October 1966. See generally Meny, Comprehensive Personal Liability
Policy Dissected, 40 Wis. B. BuLL 38 (1967); Wendorff, The New Standard Comprehensive
General Liability Insurance Policy, 1966 ABA SEcr. INs., NEG. & COMp. L. 250 (1966).
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the tort process would permit recovery. This makes the insurer's
fundamental concern with the tort process plain. Since payment by
the insurer increases its expense and minimizes profits, it is vitally
interested both in identifying and crystallizing the principles of tort
doctrine and procedure (particularly of negligence law, the chief
theory of action involved in most cases covered by insurance), in de-
creasing the scope of all potential tort liability, and in increasing the
reach of various defensive theories. Fortuitously for the industry,
the policy provision obligating the insurer to defend suits against
the insured necessarily puts insurers in the center of the litigation
arena, in a position to advocate the adoption and application of legal
doctrines that will protect not only the interests of a particular in-
sured in a particular case before the court, but also their own long-
range business interests.
The public desire that there be a financially responsible de-
fendant in automobile accident cases has led all jurisdictions to the
adoption of either financial responsibility laws or compulsory liability
insurance laws.24 Many states have "assigned-risk" laws requiring
automobile insurers (with concurrent premium increases) to insure
all applicants, irrespective of the undesirability of the risk because of
past safety record, age, and the like. Most automobile insurers have
found it profitable and many states recently have required them by
law to add to their lines a kind of accident insurance that compen-
sates the insured himself (rather than indemnifies him as liability
insurance does) when he has received bodily injury (and sometimes
property damage) at the hands of an "uninsured motorist."25 It also
is common for an automobile liability policy to provide for "medical
payments" and "collision" coverage, which is in reality accident, not
liability, insurance.
After this brief sketch we can now consider the ways in which
24 Only three states, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and New York, presently have
compulsory automobile liability insurance laws. The insurance industry is bitterly op-
posed to them, in part because of alleged adverse underwriting loss experience under
the Massachusetts law. See Deschamp, Compulsory Automobile Insurance a Failure, 6
FOR THE DEFENSE 33 (1965); Rotgin, Problems with Compulsory Automobile Insurance in
New York, 17 CI RTaum PRoP. & CAs. UND. ANNALs 245 (1964). See also KEETON & O'CON-
NELL, at 76-123; Comment, The Financially Irresponsible Motorist: A Survey of State
Legislation, 10 VrLL. L. REv. 545 (1965).
Automobile liability insurance is compulsory on a nationwide basis in Canada and
England.
25 See generally Brown, Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Litigation and Problems, 22
ARx. L. REv. 152 (1968); Soich, Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Past, Present and Future,
6 DUQUESNE L. Rxv. 341 (1968).
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the liability insurance component of our personal injury claims sys-
tem interacts with the tort process.
III
CONFLICTS BETWEEN INSURERS AND THEIR POLICYHOLDERS
It is amazing to realize the many important ways in which the
vital interests of insurers and their policyholders often come into
practical conflict. The heart of every conflict of this nature is the
familiar and persistent hope of the insurer to be able to avoid pay-
ment to or on behalf of its insured in order to protect its profits.
Naturally enough, the insurer is interested neither in defending a suit
nor in paying a settlement or judgment unless the terms of the con
tract absolutely require it. As a result the insured frequently is con-
fronted on the one hand with a tort claim against him which he
believes is within the scope of the insurance contract and with a dis-
agreeable and recalcitrant insurer on the other. The root significance
of this insurer-insured conflict of interest is that it negates many of
the fundamental assumptions upon which the tort process component
of the system builds its rules. For example, it is a frequent assumption
that liability insurance is available and in existence as to certain kinds
of risks (and these are increasing in number) at understood costs. 26
Also, it is generally assumed that everyone is either aware of his
rights or can know them by resort to counsel, and that everyone will
either assert his rights or will knowingly fail to do so. It is further
assumed that all who secure the services of counsel will be ably, hon-
estly, ethically and fully represented. It is assumed that the parties
before the court are there honestly, and not as straw men to be manip-
ulated for the interests of others. And it is assumed that the disposi-
tion of the court will secure the rights of all parties and all claims.
As the following discussion reveals, all of these assumptions are to
some extent rendered false by the conflicts engendered by the liability
insurance component of the claims system.
The first occasion for conflict arises soon after a claim against
the insured is asserted. At this time, before investigation expense has
been incurred, the insurer makes it its business to decide whether
any defenses exist under the terms of the policy, such as the defense
that the policy does not cover the accident that gave rise to the claim.
26 Cf. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 89, 94, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
100 (1968).
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At this stage the already-shaken insured may find himself in another
painful predicament. While the claim against him has not gone away,
his "coverage" may have; the insurer may simply deny coverage, dis-
claim liability, and leave the defense of the claim to its erstwhile
insured.27 Or, to compound the injury, it may be able to make the
insured the defendant in an action for a declaratory judgment of "no
coverage."28 If the insurer is successful in this action, the insured must
pay the cost of defense of both actions in addition to any judgment
entered against him. But if the insured is lucky in this situation, the
insurer will give him the option either to provide his own defense or
to execute a so-called "non-waiver" or "reservation of right" agree-
ment by which the insurer is authorized to investigate and defend
"the insured," yet still refuse to indemnify him if its defense is un-
successful.29
Even if there should be no question regarding coverage, the
following weeks may see other policy defenses raised, such as failure
.to give the insurer timely notice of the claim (even if the alleged
liability of the named insured was only vicarious, as through an omni-
bus insured). And this is so in some states regardless of whether the
insurer was prejudiced or not by the delay or failure to cooperate.30
The insured is not out of peril once the defense is undertaken.
A particularly deplorable conflict often occurs when a liability in-
27 See Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 434 (1955).
28 See Phillips, Declaratory Judgment and the Insured's Dilemma, 51 ILL. B.J. 282
(1962); 41 IND. L.J. 87 (1965). Anomalously, the insurance company will attempt to prove
the existence of a state of facts different from that asserted by the insured (including
facts upon which the insured would be liable to the claimant), and the claimant will
align himself with the insured who will attempt to prove the existence of a state of
facts within the coverage of the policy. The temptation for the insurer to resort to non-
waiver of coverage defenses is particularly great, obviously, when defenses to the claim
against the insured are marginal or worse. This only exacerbates the dilemma of the
insured.
Of course, an even more basic conflict may exist. While the insured may know that
he was at fault and not wish to defend, he has no choice under the usual policy. Under
some professional liability policies, however, the insured has some voice in the matter.
29 See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co., 384 F.2d 316 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); 19 S.C.L. REv. 210 (1967). For other examples of cases dealing with this subject
see Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958); Southern
Farm Bureau v. Logan, 288 Miss. 580, 119 So. 2d 268 (1960); Wilson v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 377 Pa. 588, 105 A.2d 804 (1954); McKenna, Insurer's Dilemma: Defend Under Non-
Waiver or Disclaim and Pray, 52 ILL. B.J. 918 (1964); Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 694 (1956);
Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1148 (1954).
80 See V. Cou=rnYmAN & T. FINMAN, Tan LAwYER IN MODERN Socmy 96-139 (1966).
See generally Note, Solution to the Inequities from a Breach of the Cooperation Clause
in Automobile Liability Insurance, 2 HOUSTON L. Ray. 92 (1964); Annot., 49 A.L.R2d
694 (1956).
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surer provides the defense and procedural compulsory counterclaim
rules (requiring a defendant to assert or waive all claims that he has
against the plaintiff arising out of the transaction that is the subject
matter of the plaintiff's suit) are applicable. An example is a property
damage claim in an automobile case also involving personal injury.
In the ordinary course of events any defendant's attorney would be
expected to be aware of such a rule and to inform his client of the
necessity of filing his counterclaim. But the insurance relation creates
a different situation. The stated contractual obligation of the in-
surer is only to "defend" claims, not to assert them, and important
rights have been lost by the disposition of claims by speedy and
literal-minded defense counsel before an insured defendant was aware
of the peril to his own claim against the plaintiff, perhaps even before
he was aware that he had a claim.31 Conversely, when a plaintiff-
insured's own claim has been settled by him, his insurers have re-
fused to defend the defendant's counterclaim against him.32 The harm
to the interests of the insured which results from these actions of
the insurers and their defense counsel does not inhere in the pro-
cedural rules themselves but from pragmatic awareness by insurer-
employed counsel that his real client is the insurer, even though the
system assumes that the insured is his client.38 It is also possible for
unscrupulous counsel simply to use the insured's counterclaim as
another of the pawns to be bargained with in settlement negotia-
tions. The possibility of a judicial remedy for the insured in such
situations does not improve the personal injury claims system, even
if it minimizes some of the disadvantages to the insured.8 4
31 See, e.g., Rothrock v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 233 Cal. App. 2d 616, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 716 (Ct. App. 1965); Stringer v. Munnell, 390 S.W.2d 484 (rex. Civ. App. 1965);
Miller, Settlement of Claim as Bar to Insured's Tort Action Against a Wrongdoer, 9 FEDN'
INS. COUNSEL 78 (Fall 1958); Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 621 (1952).
82 See, e.g., McGuire v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 431 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1968),
rev'g Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pryor, 423 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
38 See generally Keeton, Liability Insurance and Reciprocal Claims From a Single
Accident, 10 Sw. LJ. 1, 16-19 (1956); Wright, Estoppel By Rule: The Compulsory Coun-
terclaim Under Modern Pleading, 38 MINN. L. R.v. 429 (1954); The Cross Complaint
Problem, 6 FOR THE DEFENSE 58 (1965).
34 At the least the insured should be permitted to maintain an action for negligent
destruction of his claim against the insurer, on the analogy of the action for failure to
settle within policy limits. In the counterclaim situation all the insurer need do to
fulfill its duty is inform the insured that if he wishes to ascertain if he has a claim
or to assert a claim of which he is aware, he should employ independent counsel to aid
him, and that his failure to do so will destroy the claim. The insured also should have
a cause of action against defense counsel, whose duty would be the same as that of the
insurer, although the standard of liability probably should be higher because of the
attorney-client relationship which gives rise to the duty. See generally STATE BAR OF
TEXAS, PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION IN TEXAS 503-53 (1961); Keeton, Liability Insurance
and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HAitv. L. Rxv. 1136 (1954).
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Another kind of conflict is that which arises between insurer
and insured when the same insurer insures both plaintiff and defen-
dant, or two or more co-defendants with adverse interests. This can be
expected to occur with increasing frequency if underwriting should
become more highly concentrated in a few companies, as it may if
group policies become widely available. In such cases it is not unusual
to find the insurer controlling or attempting to control all sides of
the litigation pursuant to its contractual rights to defend. If there is
resistance on the ground of conflicting interests the complaints of
the insured can be met with pointed reminders of the contractual
duty of cooperation and with refusal to pay the fees of indepen-
dently retained counsel. 85 A variation on this theme arises when the
defense of several parties with conflicting interests is assigned to dif-
ferent members of the same law firm. A third variation of the mul-
tiple numbers tactic is the joinder by the insurer of an insured in-
dividual as a straw-man co-defendant with an insured business organi-
zation defendant, to make it appear to judge and jury that liability
will fall on an individual.386 As usual, the only discernible interest
of the insurer is to avoid payment.37
In contrast to the conflict resulting when one insurer covers
several adverse insureds is the situation in which several insurers
have issued policies covering the same realized risk.38 It is the natural
inclination of each insurer to try to avoid liability under its policy by
shifting it to someone else (preferably to an uninsured individual, but
if not, to another insurer) or at least by paying as little as possible.
Obviously, to the extent that any insurer is successful, the danger to
the insured, to the claimant, and to the public that the remaining in-
surers will not cover the entire claim is materially increased and not
infrequently realized.39
It is common now for various forms of first party or "accident"
insurance coverage-medical payments, uninsured motorist, and col-
lision-to be written along with personal injury and property damage
35 Cf. O'Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 167 P.2d 483 (1946); 59 HAv. L. Rlv.
1316 (1946).
36 See List v. Roto-Broil Corp. of America, 40 F.RD. 31 (Mi). Pa. 1966).
37 See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 482 (1968); Note, Some Problems Which Arise
When an Insurer Has Coverage on Both Parties to an Accident, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 744
(1966).
38 See generally Marcus, Overlapping Liability Insurance, 16 DnsX. L.J. 549 (1967).
39 See generally Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 384 F.2d 111 (10th
Cir. 1967); Marcus, supra note 38, at 549; Watson, The "Other Insurance" Dilemma, 16
FED'N INS. COUNSEL 47 (summer 1966); Note, The "Other Insurance" Clause Conflict, 46
N.C.L. REv. 433 (1968). This kind of conflict is painful to insurers as a class as well as to
others. See Risjord, Other Insurance or the Tortuous Channels of Litigation Between
Fortuitous Adversaries, 29 INs. CouNsEL J. 612 (1962).
1969]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
automobile liability insurance. And it also is common for the policy
to provide that the insurer is subrogated to the rights of the insured
in his name with respect to such first party insurance. Similar subro-
gation provisions are common in fire insurance policies. Since exer-
cise of subrogation rights makes an insurer the plaintiff, the likeli-
hood that an insurer will be the real party in interest on both sides
is great.40 This situation is so common that insurers have entered into
informal agreements which provide for arbitration rather than suit as
a means of resolving such disputes among themselves. While settling
their own disputes the insurers often disregard the interest of the in-
sured in his own claim for amounts not covered by the policy, such
as the common "deductible" amount in the usual automobile col-
lision coverage. When this is the case, common assumptions regard-
ing the range and availability of financial protection for accident vic-
tims again are in error.41
In the past few years another significant occasion for conflict of
interest has arisen from an attempt to remedy the defect of the per-
sonal injury claims system that is presented when a tortfeasor is un-
able to pay a judgment entered against him.42 Conflict arises because
the insured in addition to having liability insurance also has a rela-
tively new type of first party insurance called "uninsured motorist"
insurance which he purchases from his liability insurer. Under the
terms of this coverage, the insurer is required to pay the insured when
a person who would be liable to the insured for bodily injury under
the principles of tort law is driving an uninsured automobile (and is
thus, it is assumed in the usual case, unable to pay a judgment against
him). Although this new kind of coverage, which is compulsory in many
states and is available in most others, theoretically was designed for the
protection of the insured, in practice it exposes him to almost every
conflict-of-interest hazard that can be imagined.
Suppose, for example, that an uninsured motorist and the in-
sured are involved in an automobile collision, and that the uninsured
motorist sues the insured, who then becomes the defendant. The in-
40 The policy commonly provides that the subrogation suit may be maintained in
the name of the insured. Insurers are not at all averse to such profit as might result from
the confusion of the jury in the belief that an individual rather than an insurer is the
real party in interest. Cf. Annot., 157 A.L.R. 1261 (1945).
41 See generally R. HORN, SUBROGATION IN INsURANCE THEORY AND PRACTICE (1964);
Kircher, Set-Off and Subrogation in Automobile Medical Payments Coverage, 7 FOR THE
DEFENSE No. 10 (1966); 45 N.C.L. Rav. 1064 (1967); Annot., 19 A.L.R.8d 1054 (1968).
42 It has been estimated that 15% of the motorists currently using the highways,
or about 4,750,000, are uninsured. Aksen, Arbitration of Automobile Accident Cases, 1
CONN. L. RaV. 70, 72 (1968).
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sured defendant calls upon his insurer to provide a defense, and the
insurer responds as usual by selecting an attorney to do so. The at-
torney analyzes the case that the uninsured motorist has against the
insured. He then analyzes the position of the insured vis-4-vis the
plaintiff. He notes that the insured has suffered substantial damage
and in the normal situation would have a counterclaim against the
plaintiff. It is at this point that the first conflict of interest arises. If the
insured does not know of his uninsured motorist coverage, or has
forgotten it, or does not mention it, or does not know what it means, 43
the attorney must first decide whether to make this information avail-
able to the insurer; if the attorney decides to notify the insurer, the
insurer must decide whether or not to inform or remind him. If it
does not do so, the attorney retained by the insurer to defend its
insured must decide whether with fidelity to the insurer he can inform
the insured of his uninsured motorist coverage and whether, with
fidelity to his "client," he can fail to inform him of such coverage.
But the insured may be in trouble even if he is informed. The
socially-assumed position of the attorney is that of a defender of the
insured. There are several ways of defending him. One is to prove that
the defendant was not negligent. Another is to prove that although the
defendant was negligent, the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
Either defense is equally efficacious to defeat the claim of the plaintiff.
The problem is that, should the defendant-insured be found to be
negligent, he would not be able to recover for his own injuries against
the plaintiff because of his own contributory negligence, and thus
cannot recover for them against his own insurer on his uninsured
motorist coverage. Naturally it is to the financial advantage of the
insurer that he not recover on such coverage. And this places the
neck of the insurer on the block. For whom should the defense at-
torney act? For the insurer, who hired him? Or for the insured, to
whom his professional obligations supposedly run? If the insurer in-
sists that the attorney attempt to prove negligence of the insured as
well as of the plaintiff, what should he do? Withdraw? Most defense
counsel know that if they should withdraw the insurer would simply
assign the case to another attorney who would not be so scrupulous.
The problem of a conflict with the rights of the insured under
the "cooperation clause" of the standard liability policy is relevant also
in connection with the uninsured motorist coverage. Suppose that the
insured recognizes or is informed of his rights under the uninsured
43 Knowing when coverage exists is not always easy. Cf. Feldman, Uninsured Motorist
Coverage and Insolvent Insurers, 3 A.3A. FoRum 87 (1967).
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motorist protection, somewhat recognizes the inherent conflict with
his insurer with respect to it, and decides to act in his own interest
rather than in the interest of the insurer. He risks breach of the
cooperation clause of the liability policy, thus justifying the insurer in
refusing to provide a defense or to pay a judgment.
Yet another conflict arises when, added to the situation described
above, the insured has collision coverage with the same insurer on a
policy giving the insurer a right of subrogation to the extent of the
collision claim. If an "uninsured motorist" sues the insured, is the
insurer under any obligation to file a counterclaim for its subrogation?
Added to the usual counterclaim problems is the consideration that,
when uninsured motorist coverage is present, pursuance of a subroga-
tion claim is likely to prove the facts upon which the insured will
rely to substantiate his uninsured motorist claim. The problem remains
even if the uninsured motorist does not sue the plaintiff first: is the
insurer bound to make a claim for subrogation? To inform the insured
of his rights? If the insurer does make a claim, what is the obligation
of the attorney it has hired to the insured? Bear in mind that in both
situations, as in the case of defense under liability insurance, the
subrogation claim is pursued in the name of the insured under the
terms of the insurance contract. Under the procedural rules in some
jurisdictions, the litigation of a property damage claim alone would
bar the later assertion of a claim by the insured for personal injuries
arising out of the same accident. 44 For final measure, it has been re-
ported to the writer by insurance defense counsel that uninsured
motorist coverage problems have become so much a part of the insur-
ance scheme that in some cases the "liability-uninsured motorist"
insurer actually has taken over the defense of the uninsured motorist
against its own insured, so as to prevent a finding of liability to the
insured and thus bar a recovery by the insured on his uninsured
motorist provision. This is conflict of interest refined to perfection.45
In all of these examples the existence of insurance leads us to question
who the attorney really is representing and to whom he owes his obliga-
tion of loyalty, notwithstanding the rather clear official assumptions. 46
It would be difficult, of course, for insurers to ignore all of these
44 E.g., Spinelli v. Maxwell, 430 Pa. 478, 243 A.2d 425 (1968).
45 See generally Brown, supra note 25; Denny, Uninsured Motorist Coverage-Present
and Future, 52 VA. L. REV. 538 (1966); Hapner, A Dozen Problems in Arbitration of
Uninsured Motorist Claims Under American Arbitration Association Rules, 34 INs.
COUNSEL J. 92 (1967); Widiss, Perspectives on Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 62 Nw. U.L.
REv. 497 (1967); Note, Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Are Conflicts Inherent in Every
Provision?, 29 MONT. L. REv. 183 (1968).
46 Cf. Simal v. Clark, 27 Conn. Supp. 90, 230 A.2d 441 (Super. Ct. 1967).
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possibilities of conffict, and it is for that reason that policies commonly
provide for arbitration of disputes regarding liability and amount of
damages between the insurer and the insured. In this way a method
is provided by which at least open conflicts can be resolved in a different
forum from the court in which the insurer may be defending the
insured.47
Probably the most widely publicized conflict of interest arises in
the instance of a claim in excess of policy limits followed by an offer
by the claimant to settle within policy limits. Although the insurer
usually has the right to settle by the terms of the policy, it has a chance
to pay nothing if it declines the offer and successfully defends the
suit; it risks only the difference between the settlement offer and the
policy limits if it defends and loses. The insured, on the other hand,
has an obvious and vital interest in seeing the claim settled within
policy limits. A variation of this problem which has not been given
much attention is the situation in which the offer to settle is not
within the policy limits but is in an amount at which the insured is
willing to settle and is willing to contribute the amount in excess of
the policy limits if the insurer will contribute the face amount of the
policy. In these conflicting interest dilemmas, the insurer is in control
of both interests; whichever way it acts the interest of one party will
suffer to some extent. Not surprisingly, insurers sometimes act in their
own interests, refusing to settle within policy limits, and upon losing
the gamble leaving their insureds with staggering judgments in excess
of policy limits. 48
A small body of rules gradually has been developed to deal with
this narrow situation. Since many insureds are relatively insolvent
beyond their policy limits and customary limits are rather low in
relation to current expenses of the kind created by personal injuries,
resolution of the conflict is of extreme interest to claimants and their
attorneys as well as to insurers. So great is the concern of the latter,
that to avoid liability, attorneys representing insurance carriers are
warned by their professional associations to conduct their efforts from
47 Still other conflict problems remain. Among these is one discussed earlier but
compounded in this situation, that of "other insurance." This problem arises if an
insured who has insurance on more than one vehicle with different insurers, or who is
also covered under someone else's policy, is injured by an uninsured automobile and his
insurer refuses to pay on the ground that he has recovered under another policy. See
Kraft v. Allstate Ins. Co., 6 Ariz. App. 276, 431 P.2d 917 (Ct. App. 1967), for an example
of resolution of this conflict against the insurer.
48 It has been reported that insurers also discourage their insureds from retaining
independent counsel by telling them that the appearance of two lawyers wil make it
seem to the jury that the defendant is a person of wealth. LwisNow, supra note 18, at 90.
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the moment of receiving notice of an ad damnum clause in excess of
policy limits so as to protect the insurer in any subsequent action
against it to recover the excess claim.49 Obviously, since the interests
of insurer and insured are both important, a rule that either requires
that the insurer settle all claims or permits it to refuse to settle any of
them is unsatisfactory. It is difficult to know what standard should
be developed. The most commonly used standards require the insurer
to exercise either good faith50 or ordinary care.51
But establishment of legal standards does not necessarily relieve
the insured of the pain of conflicts of interest. Additional problems are
raised when a settlement has been wrongfully refused and a judgment
in excess of policy limits has been rendered against the insured. For
example, what damages should the insured be able to recover against
the insurer? Only the amount of the judgment against him? If more, is
there a limit on the amount of the excess for which the insurer may be
held liable?52 What if the insured has suffered great mental anguish?53
Should the measure of damages be different if the insurer has simply
refused to defend, in which case it has no opportunity to settle?
The most important question to the claimant, of course, is whether
he or the insured can recover an excess judgment directly against the
insurer, assuming that the latter is legally liable for the excess to its
insured. In this situation insurers have often refused to pay the claim-
ant on the ground that their obligation is to indemnify the insured
and consequently they have no obligation unless the insured has been
damaged; that is, until he has paid or has been requested and is able
to pay the judgment rendered against him. There is no good reason
why this defense should be permitted by the courts. 54 When it is per-
mitted the claimant simply loses his claim to any excess if the insured
is insolvent or bankrupt, and some insurers are willing to assist their
49 Defense Research Inst. Monograph, Avoiding Excess Liability (1962).
50 Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 828 P.2d 198 (1958).
51 Douglas v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 871, 127 A. 708 (1924); Stowers
Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Commission of App. Tex. 1929).
52 See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 288 (Cal. App. 1966), vacated,
66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1967). For a case approving an award of
punitive damages and attorney's fees to the insured, see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Smoot, 881 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1005 (1968).
53 See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 288 (Cal. App. 1966), vacated, 66 Cal.
2d 425, 426 P.2d 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); 46 TExAs L. RaV. 113 (1967).
54 See Sweeten v. Natl Mut. Ins. Co. of D.C., 288 Md. 525, 194 A.2d 817 (1968);
Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 228 A.2d 8 (1966); 60 MicH. L. Rxv. 517
(1962).
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insureds in going through bankruptcy in order to avoid a payout. 55
To avoid some of the difficulties, some courts have permitted the in-
sured to assign his claim against the insurer to the claimant.58 Where
assignment is not permitted the difficulty should be avoidable by the
insured, as a practical matter, simply by giving the claimant five dollars
or some other nominal sum in partial payment of the judgment against
him.5 7
Still another opportunity for conflict between the insurer and its
insured occurs in jurisdictions that permit the recovery of an award of
punitive damages against an insured defendant from an insurer whose
policy covers such liability. This is illustrated by the facts in North-
western National Casualty Co. v. McNulty,"" in which the insurer (1)
advised the insured of the possibility of excess liability in general
terms without mentioning the possibility of punitive damages; (2)
refused a settlement offer within policy limits, without telling the
insured; (3) decided to disclaim coverage liability for punitive damages,
but failed to mention this to the insured until after the trial; and (4)
elected to concede liability for compensatory damages, even though
this might have been used as a bargaining point on the issue of
punitive damages.59 The court said that it was "shocked" by the con-
duct of the insurer in failing to put the insured on notice of its
intention to deny liability for punitive damages, but held that there
could be no recovery of punitive damages against the insurer, partly
on the ground that the opposite holding would produce conflicts of
interest.60
55 See Smoot v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 299 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1962). But cf.
Harris v. Standard Acc. & Ins. Co., 297 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
843 (1962); 41 TEXAS L. Rav. 595 (1968).
56 Brown v. Guaranty Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (Cal. App. 1957);
Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8 (1966). But cf. Dillingham v.
Tri-State Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 592, 381 S.W.2d 914 (1964).
57 Smith v. Transit Cas. Co., 281 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Tex. 1968). On the subject
generally, see Keeton, supra note 33, at 1136; Knepper, Insurer's Duty to Defend: Re-
cent Developments, 17 DEF. LJ. 391 (1968) (extensive bibliography); 18 STAN. L. REV.
475 (1966). See also R. MATHEWS, PROBLEMS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF
MEhmBERS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 95 (2d ed. 1968); W. PRossER, TORTS § 88, at 565
(3d ed. 1964).
58 307 F.2d 432, 433, 436-37 n.11 (5th Cir. 1962). The opinion presents a scholarly
history and philosophy of punitive damages, as well as a discussion of its relationship to
liability insurance.
59 Id. at 441.
60 Id. at 443. The court in Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn.
639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964), in reaching the opposite result, noted the possibility of conflict,
but did not consider it determinative.
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Obviously the attorney employed by the insurer to defend the
insured is deeply implicated in all of these confficts. Although this is
not the place to consider the ethical obligations of attorneys in detail,
it is relevant to observe that it is a necessary basic assumption of the
tort process that the defendant will be fully represented by counsel.
However, when the tort process is seen as but one component of a
personal injury claims system in which the other component, liability
insurance, provides the defense, the assumption of full representation
obviously is defeated when the insurer betrays the defendant in order
to protect its own interest. Such a claims system is a much different
one from that which popular and professional lore commonly assume,
and one would suppose that it suffers qualitatively. 1 Yet as long as
private insurance with its predominant private profit motive remains
wedded to tort rules, whose only justification can be promotion of the
public welfare, it is difficult to see how these dysfunctional conflicts can
be avoided.
IV
WHAT LIABILITY INSURANCE HAS DONE TO TORT DOCTRINE
6 2
A frequently made claim for the effect of liability insurance on
tort law proceeds as follows: Insurance company settlement practices
ignore tort principles; the great majority of cases are settled by in-
surance companies; thus tort law is largely irrelevant as a practical
matter. Or as Dean Landis put it in a memorable phrase: "Taught
law is not tort law."'6 3 Naturally, this thesis has been vigorously dis-
61 Although small steps are being taken to deal with the schizophrenic role of
insurance company defense counsel, see, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Walker, 382
F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 889 U.S. 1045 (1968) (an attorney employed by an
insurance company to defend a liability action against its irnsured must protect the
insured from revelation of information which, if known to the insurer, would void cov-
erage), it is unlikely that this approach can remedy the problems of the system as a
whole. See generally COUNTRYMAN & FINMAN, supra note 30, at 96; MATHws, supra note
57, at 165; Appleman, The Relation of Trial Counsel to the Public, 61 W. VA. L. R1v.
260 (1959).
62 Of course the effects of insurance on tort doctrine are not limited to those of
liability insurance. We know, for example, that the availability of fire insurance to the
property owner has been partially responsible for a narrowing of the scope of duty of a
negligent fire starter, and thus of his liability, through the use of proximate cause doc-
trines. See Ryan v. N.Y. Central R.R., 35 N.Y. 210, 13 N.Y.S. 870 (1866) (limited to precise
facts in Frace v. N.Y., Lake Erie & Western R.R., 143 N.Y. 182, 189 (1894)); cf. Lynch v.
Fisher, 34 So. 2d 513 (La. App. Ct. 1947).
83 Landis, Book Review, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1428, 1429 (1932).
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puted.6 4 Of course, what happens to a claim is the important thing,
and it is true that most claims are settled. Yet it would be a misleading
exaggeration to suggest that tort doctrine is irrelevant to what happens
to claims--even claims that are settled, even though the refinements
of "taught law" or doctrine are probably considerably blurred in the
determination of the question of ultimate importance in the evaluation
of any claim: can either the claimant or the insurer raise a jury issue
based on some tort doctrine? If the answer is "yes," there is more
than a possibility of settlement if an amount can be agreed on. In
short, as we shall see, insurance company and claimants' settlement
practices usually disregard doctrinal refinements, but they do not make
tort doctrine irrelevant. 65
There also is a substantial body of opinion that the addition of
liability insurance to the tort process has created a system in which
the keystone of tort doctrines-the doctrine of fault-is virtually
eliminated in importance in other ways.(6 One argument in support of
this opinion is that the assumption of the availability of insurance
causes judges and juries to ignore traditional doctrine in making a
liability decision. 67 Our folklore has it that this assumption, as well as
actual knowledge of insurance coverage, tends to produce results not
contemplated by the tort process. There is much speculation that it
results both in a greater number of verdicts for plaintiffs and in
higher verdicts.68 It can also be argued, of course, that most jurors are
themselves policy holders and that their sensitivity to insurance would
tend to make them protective of their own premium rates and thus
defendant-oriented.6 9 Both arguments suggest that in cases in which
64 See W. BLUm & H. KALvEN, PUBLic LAW PERSPcTivas ON A PRivATE LAw PROBLEM
(1965) and recent studies referred to therein. See generally Leflar, Negligence in Name
Only, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 564 (1952); McNiece & Thornton, Is the Law of Negligence Obso-
lete?, 1952 ST. JOHN'S L. Ray. 225.
65 KEEroN & O'CoNNFlaL at 24-27. However, Keeton and O'Connell refer to settlement
practices as "[p]erhaps the most important effect of tort liability insurance in reducing
the significance of fault in automobile claims." Id. at 254.
66 See, e.g., L. GREEN, TRAFFIC VicTMS-ToRT LAW AND INSURANCE 66-68 (1958);
IsoN, supra note 3, at 8; KErON & O'CONNELL at 15-24, 244-46, 252-56; Conard, supra
note 13, at 306; Pretzel, Do We Need the Collateral Source Rule?, 17 DEF. L.J. 1, 5
(1968). Contra, Maryott, Remarks, in Ciusis 27, 32.
67 KEETON & O'CONNELL at 27, 73, 252-56. To Dean Leon Green, "The greatest
changes in negligence law, including many of the changes in the doctrines themselves,
are the products of liability insurance." GREN, supra note 66, at 77; cf., Franklin,
Replacing The Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53
VA. L. Ray. 774, 782 (1967).
68 See KEETON & O'CONN.LL at 22-24.
69 Id. See also Appleman, Jury Verdicts and Insurance Rates, 1962 INs. L.J. 714.
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the assumption is made, the questions raised by the facts in relation to
various legal doctrines and submitted to the jury for its determination
actually are not answered, but that cases are decided on some ad hoc
basis. If this were correct the effect of the combination of insurers'
success in hiding the real party in interest and the blind assumption
that the defendant is insured would be virtually to eliminate the
doctrinal component of the tort process. But the actual effects are
uncertain. The assumption could lead either to more or fewer insurers'
verdicts, or to more or fewer claimants' verdicts; it also could lead
either to higher or lower verdicts for either party. Under the theory
that juries tend to "sock it to" insurers, the effect obviously is disastrous
in a case in which the jury wrongly assumes that the defendant is
insured.70 As Professor Ison recently has put it:
While theoretically, fault is always the criterion, in practice,
there has been a strong tendency for liability to follow the inci-
dence of insurance.... [I]n its social impact, liability is quantita-
tively significant only in areas in which it is customary for liability
insurance to be carried. The point is not whether a particular
claim is insured, but whether it is of a class that is usually cov-
ered by insurance.71
All these possibilities, if they have a basis in fact, support Dean Green's
observation that "[I]t becomes more and more difficult to mix in-
surance with negligence law and retain the law's integrity."7 2 A more
pointed way of looking at the situation is that the mixture produces
an entirely different system, with characteristics different from those
of the tort process alone.
Another common assertion is that the assumed availability of
insurance injects into the tort litigation process cases that are not
susceptible of being judged by its rather simple traditional standards
and procedures and which therefore necessarily are judged by other
and unknown standards. Automobile accident litigation is a familiar
example. Professional malpractice is another.
How much has insurance influenced tort doctrine? Almost twenty
years ago it was suggested that whatever its direct impact, the existence
and availability of liability insurance had produced "a climate of
opinion in which extension of liability is inevitable." 73 No one could
deny, of course, that sweeping changes have taken place throughout
70 KEETON & O'CONNELL at 23.
71 ISON, supra note 3, at 8 (footnote omitted).
72 GREEN, supra note 66, at 78.
73 James & Thornton, The Impact of Insurance on the Law of Torts, 15 LAw &
CONTEMp. PRoB. 431, 432 (1950).
[Vol. 54:645
PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS SYSTEM
tort law in the twentieth century, but undoubtedly many factors have
contributed to those changes, and the assertion that liability insurance
has greatly altered the common law tort process does not go unchal-
lenged. There are those who say that the contribution of insurance
has been very much overstated-even "amazingly slight." 74 Professor
Kalven, one of the most vigorous champions of the status quo in
personal injury reparations, asserts that it is a basic characteristic of
the tort system that it regards third party insurance as irrelevant,75 and
he purports to describe the system without mention of anything about
insurance but its irrelevance. 76
As is always the case when many causes contribute to produce a
result, it is difficult in retrospect to assess the amount of the contribu-
tion of each with precision. Although appellate courts have not made
much mention of liability insurance in explaining the results they
reach, this does not mean that they have not been influenced by it.
It is certain that some are. In a notable recent opinion the California
Supreme Court stated expressly that "the availability, cost, and prev-
alence of insurance for the risk involved"7 7 is a major consideration
in determining the duty of a defendant to a plaintiff in a negligence
case. Moreover, appellate cases represent only a small portion of all
decided cases, and we don't know for sure how much the existence
of liability insurance affects the thinking of trial judges. But when
proof is or seems to be lacking, the party having the burden of proof
loses. Perhaps it is for this reason, lack of proof, that the official as-
sumption that the same old tort standards are being applied does not
seem to be wavering. Nonetheless, further inquiry is warranted. It
would seem that if rules are worth having it would be well to know
what they are, which we may not know if the traditional fault doctrine
really has been blurred or destroyed. This is particularly true in light
of another official assumption, discussed earlier, that fault rules are
designed for achievement of social goals. If we no longer have the
rule perhaps we should inquire as to whether its supposed goals are in
fact being achieved by any other means.
One of these traditional "goals" is the deterrence of dangerous
conduct. As mentioned earlier, there is doubt as to whether deterrence
is best described as a goal or an effect (if it is an effect). Whether tort
law is an adequate means for achieving it also is questionable. I have
74 PRoSsER, supra note 57, § 84, at 569.
75 Kalven, supra note 7, at 35.
76 Id. at 84-36.




always thought it strange that anyone could think that doctrines of
which at most only a tiny fraction of the populace is aware could
affect conduct in the slightest.78 This is not the place, however, to
consider fully the question of deterrence. Presumably the deterrence of
harmful conduct is desirable, if it is possible, and obviously courts
and others concerned with the system usually assume that tort rules
in fact serve a deterrent function. If so, as discussed hereafter, the
necessary effect of liability insurance even for compensatory damages
is to minimize deterrence. Thus liability insurance may tend to make
drivers less careful.79 It might be suggested in reply that the threat of
increased premiums steps in to reinforce safe conduct.80 This may be
true as to some insureds, but on the whole it has not been demon-
strated. It is clear that some insurers have worked diligently to reduce
their losses by promoting safe driving, conducting studies and publicity
campaigns, and instituting safety incentive systems such as merit
premium rating practices. In some areas, such as in elevator operation,
and in the trucking industry, they seem to have been quite successful.
Whether they have had any more success with respect to automobile
driving than have the liability rules of the tort process alone or with the
criminal process is unknown. Lack of knowledge has only served to
free proponents of opposing views to issue dogmatic pronouncements
in support of their own positions.81 The subject is complex, partly
because lack of empirical verification makes it almost wholly theoretical.
Professor Calabresi has called attention to distinctions that seem useful
in trying to reach sound conclusions. One is the distinction between
"specific" deterrence, or the equivalent of coercive commands, and
"general" deterrence, or the equivalent of the influence of market pres-
sures. With respect to the latter, he also distinguishes "bargain" (con-
tractual) transactions, which lend themselves to deliberate decisions
regarding safe or unsafe conduct, and other "non-bargain" conduct. 82
He also has demonstrated the difficulty of making economic cost
allocations on the basis of incomplete data.83
In light of the importance to human beings of non-economic and
even irrational sources of satisfaction, the importance of economic
78 Cf. KEETON & O'CONNELL at 248.
79 Consider the reported conduct of the insured in Herschensohn v. Weisman, 80
N.H. 557, 119 A. 705 (1923), cited in PRossER, supra note 57, § 83, at 564. Is it representa-
tive? It seems unlikely that many are that foolhardy.
80 Cf. KEEON & O'CONNELL at 265.
81 For a persuasive and non-dogmatic opinion, see Kimball, supra note 5, at 14.
82 Calabresi, supra note 13, at 221-37.
83 Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Com-
ment, 11 J. LAw & ECON. 67 (1968).
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theory to deterrence can be overstated. Some human behavior may even
be motivated by altruistic concern for other humans. Although all the
ramifications of the relationship of economic and other factors cannot
be considered here, it is relevant to note that if economic considera-
tions told the whole Story of deterrence, the problem of the com-
patibility of the goal of deterrence with other goals, such as full com-
pensation and optimal risk spreading, would remain. It would seem, for
example, that perfect risk spreading could be achieved only at a cost
of complete loss of general deterrence.8 4 This indicates that even after
current economic theories are verified, compromises will have to be
effectuated. What is needed is further study of both the "specific" effect
of tort rules and of "general" deterrence. Insurance company sloganeer-
ing which reinforces the judicial assumption of "specific" effect rules
tends both to inhibit needed investigation of that assumption and to
divert attention from the area in which it is needed most, that of
general deterrence.3 5
The point upon which we want to concentrate here, however, is
not simply that liability insurance has had some effect upon tort doc-
trines or upon their supposed goals.8 6 After all, virtually all changes in
the environment affect tort law. The question is whether liability in-
surance has had an overall impact so great as to change the personal
injury claims system from what at one time could have been called
"the tort system" to something entirely different. It is this difference
and its significance that is our greatest concern for the present. It is for
this reason that we should give attention to some of the specific tort
doctrines and problem areas most directly affected by liability in-
surance: governmental and other immunity doctrines and defenses;
the liabilities of automobile drivers to their passengers; the liabilities
of manufacturers and their legal counterparts; the liabilities of dis-
pensers of liquor; the liabilities of infants and mental incompetents; and
others.
It is commonly thought that some of the principal effects of liabil-
ity insurance have been felt in the gradual narrowing of the various im-
84 Cf. id. at 69-70.
85 On the subject of deterrence generally, see BLum & KALVEN, supra note 64, at 75;
KEETON & O'CONN E. at 13-15, 46 and authorities there cited; Calabresi, The Decision
for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REy. 713 (1965);
Calabresi, supra note 13, at 216; Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the
Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Conard & Jacobs, New Hope for Consensus in the
Automobile Injury Impasse, 52 A.B.A.J. 533 (1966); Kalven, supra note 7, at 40.
80 See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
57 YAm L.J. 549 (1948); James & Thornton, supra note 73, where the impact of liability
insurance on tort doctrine is carefully considered.
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munities from liability,87 all of which are predicated on the poverty of
the defendant. The leading case establishing the governmental im-
munity doctrine reasoned from the absence of a municipal treasury,88
and the charitable immunity doctrine has a similar rationale.8 9 Intra-
family immunity usually is predicated upon the desire to avoid dis-
ruption that might be expected to result when one member of a family
is required to pay his own money to another member.90 Obviously, the
availability of an insurance fund from which to satisfy legal liability
eliminates the "bankruptcy" and "disharmony" reasons for immunity
in each of these kinds of cases.91 Although it is difficult to say what
effect an assumed increase in the availability of insurance actually has
had on the demonstrable fact that these judicially conferred immunities
seem to be on the wane, there would seem to be more than a coin-
cidental connection between them.92 Governmental bodies certainly
are purchasing more liability insurance now than they did formerly.
It would be nice at this point to say that insurance has thus had
the effect of widening the protection of the tort process. But unfor-
tunately even the actual existence of an insurance policy does not
guarantee liability, even if the facts and available theories would seem
to compel it. Immunities are remarkably persistent. Although one
would not usually expect that a governmental body could purchase
liability insurance with its citizens' tax dollars and still claim immunity,
many courts have permitted this defense to stand in the face of existing
insurance covering the claim. A few, however, have begun to call the
purchase of insurance a "waiver" of the immunity.93 The. defense of
governmental immunity in these circumstances seems the more anom-
alous when it is remembered that it is the insurer that asserts the
immunity defense when the defendant has a liability insurance policy.
87 See generally James, supra note 86, at 553; James & Thornton, supra note 73, at
437-40.
88 Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
89 Williams' Adm'x v. Church Home for Females and Infirmary for Sick, 223 Ky.
355, 3 S.W.2d 753 (1928). See James & Thornton, supra note 73, at 439, 440.
9D Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
91 Cf. Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 204 N.E.2d 635, 256 N.Y.S.2d
595 (1965); Logan v. Reaves, 209 Tenn. 631, 354 S.W2d 789 (1962); Southern Meth. Univ.
v. Clayton, 176 S.W.2d 749 (rex. 1943).
92 See, e.g., Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966) and authorities cited;
Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963); O'Conner v. Boulder Colorado
Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P.2d 835 (1939). With regard to governmental im-
munity, see generally Gibbons, Liability Insurance and the Tort Immunity of State and
Local Government, 1959 DuKE L.J. 588; Green, Freedom of Litigation (111): Municipal
Liability for Torts, 38 IsL. L. REv. 355 (1944).
93 E.g., City of Knoxville v. Bailey, 222 F.2d 520, 526 (6th Cir. 1955).
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Although this is not necessarily improper, it does raise questions. Do
governmental bodies pay the same premium as others purchasing
similar "protection?" It would seem that the availability of the im-
munity defense should vary with the answer. Although the courts
have not yet considered this an important factor, many governmental
policies now specifically provide that the insurer will not avail itself
of the insured's immunity; some provide that immunity will not be
asserted without the permission of the insured.94
Insurance is the only reasonable explanation for the filing of
almost all intra-family tort suits.95 Its existence does, therefore, lead
to litigation in jurisdictions where the immunity is abolished. But it
does not follow, as claimed by supporters of the immunity, that the
intra-family immunity rule precludes litigation, or that its abandon-
ment increases litigation. It may merely change the parties to a suit.
In the two car accident case, for example, it merely forces the passenger-
spouse to sue the non-settling driver of the other car instead of his
spouse;96 in other kinds of cases the offending spouse's employer or
principal may come to be the defendant. Some courts have predicated
intra-family immunity upon the possibility of collusion against the
insurer,97 although it seems no more likely that spouses would collude
than any others. The effect of this argument simply is to expand the
reach of the unconscionable guest statutes98 or doctrines to yet another
area in which collusion, while possible, is likely only under a rather
paranoid view of human nature. Of course, insurers are not content
to urge retention of intra-family immunities on this single ground.
They also are in favor of maintaining domestic harmony within the
family unit as against the threat of impersonal litigation. Apparently
insurers are unaware of the domestic discord and misery created by
accidents that go uncompensated because of the immunity. The public
policy "family disharmony" argument has been neatly disposed of by
some courts, 9  and it has been shown empirically that insurance rates
94 See 54 MIcH. L. REv. 404 (1956); 18 Wyo. L.J. 220 (1964). The provisions referred
to in the text create their own problems. See James & Thornton, supra note 73, at 436-37.
Regarding policy coverage, see Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 1282 (1969).
95 See James & Thornton, supra note 73, at 432-35. See generally Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d
632 (1955).
98 See, e.g., Morrissett v. Morrissett, 80 Nev. 566, 397 P.2d 184 (1964).
97 Lubowitz v. Taines, 293 Mass. 39, 198 N.E. 320 (1936); Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore.
286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955). But cf. Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alas. 1963).
98 These statutes are discussed at pp. 675-76 infra.
99 E.g., Lo Galbo v. Lo Galbo, 138 Misc. 485, 246 N.Y.S. 565 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Bogen
v. Bogen, 219 N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941). In Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245
N.E2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969), a suit by a parent against her child, the New York
Court of Appeals said:
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are no higher in states without the immunity than in those with it.100
Quite recently the California Supreme Court abolished the im-
munity of one in control of land for negligence in maintaining a
latent, dangerous condition which causes injury to a social guest.
In Rowland v. Christian'' the court declared that "the availability,
cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved" are major
considerations in determining the duty of the landowner-controller,
and in rejecting the traditional "licensee" status of the social guest as
determinative of duty gave weight to the absence of proof that to do
so would reduce the prevalence or increase the cost of insurance. 10 2
The survival of some immunity rules despite their lack of merit
can be explained only by the power of persistent advocacy in the
courts. While liability insurance has made the immunities anachro-
nisms, ironically its union with the tort process also has kept them
alive.103
Consideration of the system created by liability insurance and
tort doctrine would not be complete without mention of other kinds
of defensive doctrines. Although the availability of insurance prob-
ably has not influenced the development of other traditional de-
fenses as significantly as it has immunities, the existence of insurers
has probably been the most important factor in the retention of sev-
eral defenses that have outlived their usefulness. Contributory negli-
gence is a prime example. There is little, if anything, to recommend
it, and much to be said for other ways of taking the plaintiff's fault
into account. However, for obvious reasons insurers and the organized
defense bar lobby tirelessly, both in litigation and extra-judicially,
for retention of contributory negligence, which they extoll as if it
had been designed in heaven. The far superior comparative negli-
The parties recognize, as we must, that there is compulsory automobile in-
surance in New York. Such insurance effectively removes the argument favoring
continued family harmony as a basis for prohibiting this suit. The present liti-
gation is, in reality, between the parent passenger and her insurance carrier.
Id. at 438, 245 N.E.2d at 193-94, 247 N.YS.2d at 531.
100 Tilton, Inter-Spousal Immunity Rule and the Effect of Liability Insurance
in Automobile Accidents, 11 S.D.L. REv. 144 (1966).
lo 69 Cal. 2d 89, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
102 Id. at 99, 443 P.2d at 567-68, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103-04. For a further discussion, see
note 129 infra.
103 For interesting examples of the anomalies which immunity rules create, see
Soirez v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 168 So. 2d 418 (La. App. Ct. 1964) (wife could not sue
husband, but could sue his insurer under La. direct action statute); Franco v. Davis, 51
N.J. 237, 239 A.2d 1 (1968) (immunity upheld against adopted daughter who after acci-
dent became emancipated by marriage).
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gence doctrine they treat as akin to legalized incest.104 There can be
no doubt of their success. Despite reports that it operates effectively
under a well-drawn statute, 05 comparative negligence has been
adopted in only six states. Ironically, the efforts of insurers may be
self-defeating. If the public becomes familiar with the contributory
negligence defense and its effects, and if jurors always assume that the
defendant is insured, they may tend to find the plaintiff negligent only
in extreme cases.'0 6
If the contributory negligence doctrine seems unwise there is
another, favored by insurers, which is even more questionable. This
is the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence. 0 7 Under ordinary
circumstances insurers could be expected to deplore extensions of
liability through various vicarious liability doctrines and statutes
whose very existence is attributable to the assumption that liability
insurance is available. 08 However, when an insurer provides the de-
fense for the driver of an automobile that allegedly struck an auto-
mobile in which the plaintiff was a passenger (or defends some third
party who allegedly caused a plaintiff's harm), 0 9 it is only too happy
to impute the negligence of the plaintiff's driver (or companion, in a
non-auto case) to the plaintiff, to transmute it to "contributory neg-
ligence," and to interpose it as a defense to the claim. In a few cases
it has even been applied like a guest statute to bar suits by a pas-
senger against his own driver." 0 Although this defense almost always
is limited to the "joint enterprise" doctrine of vicarious liability, a
few community property states still retain an anachronistic "domes-
tic relations" imputation of contributory negligence,"' ostensibly on
moralistic grounds, although reasons related to the insurance business
are apparent.
In automobile accident litigation, where the negligence doctrine
almost always is relied on by the plaintiff, the guest statutes enacted
104 Examples are too numerous to mention. For a recent one, see Rule of Com-
parative Negligence Could Lead to Parade of Horrors, 69 INsuaANcn 50 (1968).
105 Decker, Some Random Observations About Comparative Negligence and the
Trial Process in Wisconsin, 1 CONN. L. REv. 56 (1968).
108 Cf. Kx oN & O'CONNE-L at 253, citing Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The
Impact of Insurance, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PRon. 219, 221, 230 (1958).
107 See PRossm, supra note 57, § 68, at 471 and authorities cited.
10s Good examples are the "family car" doctrine, id. § 72, at 496-99, and "consent"
statutes, id. at 499-501.
109 Id. § 71, at 493-94.
110 Id.
111 Id. § 78, at 508.
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by many states preclude recovery by a "guest" passenger against his
driver "host" (and sometimes by the owner against the driver) ex-
cept when there has been a high degree of misconduct. The prin-
cipal rationale of these statutes is that they protect insurance com-
panies from collusion by an insured driver and his guest. Another
claimed justification is avoidance of a result of such collusion-in-
creased rates charged to the motoring public.112 Since the traditional
tort process is virtually helpless at every point against the deliberate
lie, it seems anomalous, to say the least, that this particular situa-
tion should have been singled out by public policy makers for such
drastic treatment. However, if the reason for guest statutes is not to
eliminate falsehood but to reduce potential liability, they are more
understandable. These statutes have been "largely the work of in-
surance companies in the legislatures," '18 and the courts have been
similarly cooperative. Whatever the merits of these defensive doc-
trines, guest statute questions and imputed contributory negligence
questions have been the cause of a great deal of litigation at public
expense, and there often has been the denial of claims for no reason
that the tort process alone would have recognized as sound. In other
words, the union of insurance and tort process has produced diam-
etrically different and illogical results. 114
A number of cases suggest that at least one of the justifications
for "strict" or enterprise liability doctrines is the notion that a person
who is in the business of providing products or services to others
usually is in a better position than a person injured by the product or
service to bear the loss because the enterpriser can insure and distri-
bute the costs of the insurance premium among all those with whom
he deals as a cost of the goods and services. 115 It is not clear what
112 But cf. McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 382-84,
113 N.W.2d 14, 19 (1962).
113 PaossER, supra note 57, § 83, at 566. See Naudzius v. Lahr, 258 Mich. 216, 225-26,
284 N.W. 581, 584 (1931); Allen, Why Do Courts Coddle Automobile Indemnity Com-
panies?, 61 Am. L. Rav. 77 (1927); White, The Liability of an Automobile Driver to a
Non-paying Passenger, 20 VA. L. Rxv. 326 (1934). See generally Hodges, The Automobile
Guest Statutes, 12 TaxAs L. Rav. 303 (1934).
114 See generally Comment, Private Insurance as a Solution to the Driver-Guest
Dilemma, 62 Mxcfr. L. REV. 506 (1962).
315 Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963); Greenman
v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 877 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1968) (See
also Seely v. White Motor Co., 68 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965));
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 486, 440 (1944) (concurring
opinion); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 248, 218 N.E2d 185, 199
(1966) (dissenting opinion); PRoss-a, supra note 57, § 70, at 481.
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impact this reasoning really has had on the courts in the undoubted
trend toward strict liability in this area. As Dean Prosser correctly
points out, it is not generally referred to by the courts as a reason for
imposing strict liability.116 Why is this so? With regard to appellate
courts, one explanation for failure to mention it more often may be
simply that it is not one of their reasons. And since trial courts usually
are not required to articulate their decisions, it is impossible to know
with certainty what motivates them in advancing strict liability. But
failure to mention insurance does not mean that insurance does not
strongly influence judicial thought. One judge has suggested persua-
sively that although courts suspect that an enterprise can pass the
costs of claims to the consuming public, they do not know for sure.117
This would tend to inhibit articulation of the insurance rationale
as the ratio decidendi even if it were the real basis for decision.
Of course, we are no longer shocked at the suggestion that unarticu-
lated and merely intuited economic theories provide the basis for
judicial action. Real or imagined political hazards may also inhibit
judges from expressing what to many influential people in the com-
munity is still a radical doctrine. Thus judicial timidity may well
provide the answer to Dean Prosser.
As far back as 1921 Dean Pound thought he observed in the
courts a growing tendency to ask "who can best bear the loss[?]"' 18
It seems likely to me that the fantastically increased availability and
use of liability insurance in the succeeding years has affected the
judicial mind greatly in the development of strict liability. Indeed,
it is difficult to think of any other rational explanation. 19 Perhaps
the doctrine promotes safety to some extent, but the careful manu-
facturer is no more safe from liability when his product is defective
than the careless one.
Needless to say, strict liability is opposed by insurers at every op-
portunity for the obvious reason that, under strict liability, liability
insurance is almost the equivalent of accident insurance from the
standpoint of the insurer's risk. Thus, for example, the insurance in-
116 PROSSER, supra note 57, § 84, at 575-76; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1121 (1960).
117 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 248, 218 N.E.2d 185, 199
(1966) (dissenting opinion).
118 R. POUND, THE SPirr OF THE COMMON LAW 189 (1921).
119 For interesting discussions of the theory of loss distribution through liability
insurance, see C. Movaas, TORTS 248-53 (1953); Douglas, Vicarious Liability and the Ad-
ministration of Risk pts. I & II, 38 YA. E L.J. 584 (1928), 38 YALE L.J. 720 (1929); Morris,
Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YA=E L.J. 1172 (1952).
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dustry has even opposed Professor Cavers' modest suggestion 20 for
improving the financial protection of the public against nuclear risks.
As is true of every area of the tort process touched by liability
insurance, the final word has not yet been said. "Strict" liability of
sorts is now with us, and by hypothesis it is founded at least in part
upon the assumption of the availability of liability insurance. One
interesting question is what happens to the tort doctrine if liability
insurance should no longer be available?121 The question is not purely
hypothetical, for whatever impact insurance has had in the past on
the development of manufacturers' tort liability for harm caused by
their products, development of new theories of liability has affected
insurance coverages. The redesigned 1966 standard comprehensive
general policy deliberately excludes from its coverage many of the
most severe risks encountered in the use of products. For example,
design defects or failures to perform to standard (as opposed to mal-
function) of the kind encountered in Santor v. Karagheusian, Inc.122
are not covered under the new policy.123 How the courts will in turn
respond remains to be seen. If the official myth is correct, they are
not concerned with the availability of insurance. Even if they are
concerned, they merely assume the availability of insurance, and the
trial process affords no means of ascertaining whether or not there
actually is coverage in a given case. Moreover, even if potential cov-
erage exists, there presently is no way to guarantee that a given de-
fendant or potential defendants as a class will take advantage of the
opportunity to insure, that they will insure adequately, or that they
120 In connection with the problem of the tremendous damages which might be
suffered as the result of the use of nuclear energy as a source of electric power, Congress
has required nuclear reactor operators to carry liability insurance in amounts prescribed
by the Atomic Energy Commission. Cavers, Wanted: Better Financial Protection for the
Public Against Nuclear Risks, TAR 12 (Apr.-May 1968). But as Professor Cavers has
pointed out, and as we know, liability insurance does not guarantee liability. Conse-
quently, Professor Cavers has proposed several conceptual methods for imposing a stan-
dard of strict liability which, together with liability insurance, would guarantee liability
in the event of a nuclear accident. Id. at 13.
121 In the related area of professional responsibility, it has been suggested that the
availability of liability insurance might provide the basis for a change to a strict stan-
dard of liability. COUNTRYMAN & FINUAN, supra note 30, at 73-74. Such a change obvi-
ously would assume the continued availability of coverage. As an illustration of such
an assumption, in a recent medical malpractice case, Judge J. Skelly Wright stated
that "today, with insurance, financial responsibility is not one of the dangers to the
doctor in a malpractice suit." Brown v. Keaveny, 326 F.2d 660, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(dissent).
122 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
123 See Tarpey, The New Comprehensive Policy: Some of the Changes, 33 INs.
COUNSEL J. 223 (1966).
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will be able to pass the costs of insurance on to consumers as a
class.-24 At present the withdrawal of coverage for certain kinds of
liability remains a real possibility throughout the spectrum of tort
doctrine. This inescapable fact dramatizes the miscegenetic relation-
ship of the tort process and liability insurance in the claims system.
For although the rules of the tort process have been oriented largely
toward the interest of the public (which includes the interests of
particular litigants as well as of the insurance industry), the liability
insurance side of the union is concerned with its own financial in-
terest alone. That difficulty would be encountered in making the
two work in harness over a long haul is not surprising.
Insurance for dispensers of liquor exemplifies a problem shared
by all high-risk enterprises and their consumers. Although the com-
mon law and statutory liabilities of tavern (dram shop) owners and
other dispensers of liquor represent an expansion of liability rather
than a limitation, it cannot be doubted that this expansion was also
influenced by the actual or assumed availability-albeit limited and
expensive-of liability insurance by means of which a dispenser can,
if he wishes, protect himself and theoretically spread the cost to his
customers.125 As in the case of the manufacturer, one wonders what
happens to that rationale under the usual products and premises
policies, as well as the 1966 standard comprehensive general liability
policy, all of which exclude dram shop liability coverage. 126 When
such insurance is available, the premium rates are high compared to
other kinds of liability risks. If the price of special dram shop liability
coverage is so high that it cannot be passed on to the consuming
public, this may well mean that the injured victim of a dram shop
patron must in practical effect bear the loss irrespective of liability
theories. If so, as far as the victim is concerned there is no practical
difference from the situation at pre-insurance common law if the
tavern owner is insolvent or relatively so. Of course, if he is solvent
124 See Prosser, supra note 116, at 1121. Like many courts, Professor Ehrenzweig
apparently overlooked the practical difficulties of ensuring the availability of insurance
in his series of articles advocating conflicts of law rules predicated upon "insurable"
laws for the imposition of liability upon a motorist to his injured guest, Ehrenzweig,
Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws-Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under
"Foreseeable and Insurable Laws": I, 69 YALE L.J. 595 (1960); upon a manufacturer to
an injured consumer of this product, Ehrenzweig, Products Liability in the Conflict of
Laws-Toward a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws":
II, 69 YALE L.J. 794 (1960); and to those whom the courts hold "vicariously liable,"
Ehrenzweig, Vicarious Liability in the Conflict of Laws-Toward a Theory of Enterprise
Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws": III, 69 YALE L.J. 978 (1960).
125 See 1954 U. ILL. L.F. 503, 504.
126 See generally Tarpey, supra note 123, at 118.
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there is a big practical difference. This is a big practical difference
to the uninsured owner, too. For if his business constitutes his prin-
cipal asset, he may have to liquidate it in order to pay the judgment.
Even if liability insurance should be made compulsory, prohibitive
premium rates may put dram shops out of business. The net result
of such insurance-influenced liability rules may be a drastic decrease
in this kind of economic and social activity, and in any other kind of
high-risk activity to which they are applied. It would seem preferable
that this sort of policy decision be made explicitly on accurate em-
pirical grounds, with full consideration of the stakes and the alterna-
tives. The continued assumption of the practical availability of insur-
ance is beginning to seem too undependable a basis. 127
Although at first glance the liability of infants and mental in-
competents may seem an unlikely area in which to find the influence
of insurance, that insurance has in fact resulted in the imposition of
liability where none would otherwise exist under the principles of the
tort process is well documented. 2 . The assumed availability of and
resort to insurance is the only explanation for the recent appearance
of minors in the appellate reports as defendants with respect to
"adult" activities, including but not limited to the driving of auto-
mobiles. But again the question of the effect on these new doctrines
of the non-availability of insurance arises. We know, for example,
that automobile insurance may be virtually unavailable to a person
under twenty-five because of high premium cost or unwillingness
of the insurer to contract. Although the imposition of liability on
youthful drivers may be justified, it may not be justified on the
grounds upon which it is in fact imposed-that the youthful driver
is protected by insurance.
Mention should also be made of the way in which insurance,
both liability and accident, has converted virtually all fire cases into
litigation between a subrogated fire insurer and a liability insurer,
and the way in which the combination of contractual indemnity
agreements and insurance guaranteeing them between owner-em-
ployers, contractors, and subcontractors in the building industry has
rendered moot the efforts of courts to allocate the losses.
In summary, there is reason to believe that the addition of lia-
bility insurance to the tort process has had considerable effect on the
resulting system. The necessities of the insurance business dictate that
127 See generally Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 858 (1967).
128 James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57
YALE L.J. 549, 554-56 (1948).
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almost all claims be settled, rather than litigated. And in settlement
practice tort rules are suggestive rather than determinative. Even as
to cases that are litigated, the assumption, true or false, that in-
surance is available and that the defendant is insured leads to deci-
sion by standards other than the official standards of the tort process.
Moreover, the assumption of insurance brings into the courts great
numbers of cases with which the tort process simply is not equipped
to deal, but which it disposes of nonetheless.
Our personal injury claims system makes assumptions about
insurance which are often false, sometimes contradictory, and some-
times both. It falsely assumes the absence of funds when it immunizes
governments, charities, and family members from liability. And in-
surers fight stoutly to maintain the false assumption. On the other
hand, where an assumption about the existence of insurance probably
is correct, as in guest statute litigation, it assumes that because there
is insurance the insurer should not have to pay. Then in three other
areas it assumes the availability of insurance (perhaps wrongly) and
bases liability upon that assumed fact; manufacturers, contractors,
dispensers of alcoholic beverages, infants and mental incompetents
are held to standards of conduct higher than those which the tort
process alone would impose. Other examples probably will occur to
the reader.
Although the diligent and serious efforts of judges, lawyers, and
scholars to improve the public welfare by improving tort doctrine
are praiseworthy, their efforts may be futile in a system in which
liability insurance is an integral component. So long as control of
the actual availability of insurance lies almost wholly in the hands
of the insurers, reality is subject to daily change and all assumptions
are precarious. Any rule that relates liability to insurance is as likely
to harm as to improve the public welfare.129
129 In the significant case of Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 89, 443 P.2d 561,
70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), the supreme court took what the writer believes to be two
important and unprecedented steps, quite apart from its rejection of the traditional
categorical status of a social guest as a test of liability in a negligence case. First, the
court specifically held that insurance is a "major consideration" in determining the duty
of the defendant to the plaintiff in an ordinary negligence case. But more importantly,
the court did not stop with a general reference to the relevance of insurance. To it the
important factors were "the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk
involved." Id. at 94, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100. Obviously, the writer shares
the court's view of the significance of these factors. But how a court is to obtain the
needed information, and how it can be assured of stasis are open questions. The court
in Rowland was not badly troubled by these problems. It said, ".... the cost of insurance,
will, of course, vary depending upon the rules of liability adopted, but there is no




WHAT LIABiLiTY INSURANCE HAS DONE TO TORT PROCEDURE
The effect of the liability insurance institution on the procedures
by which tort cases are determined has been at least as great as its
impact on the substance of tort law. Highly active insurance industry
research and public relations staffs, devoted to influencing the courts,
the public, and the legislatures in the interest of higher profits for in-
surance companies, have not neglected the procedural aspects of the
tort process. Thus the insurance industry has been the staunch and
vocal defender of the civil jury system, of the unanimous jury ver-
dict, of the "adversary process," and of the special issue, special ver-
dict, or interrogatory methods of obtaining jury verdicts, which hide
from the jury the effect of its answers. 80 As is usual regarding any-
thing affecting its interests, it has not hesitated to carry the argu-
ments for the procedures it prefers directly to the courts by means of
published literature which it disseminates. Recently- claimants' at-




Some of the strongest efforts have been directed toward pro-
cedures affecting the deliberations of the jury. Even though almost
all jurors and all judges probably now assume that the defendant is
occupier's liability will naturally reduce the prevalence of insurance due to increased
cost or even substantially increase the cost." Id. at 99, 443 P.2d at 567-68, 70 Cal. Rptr.
at 103-04. As this article shows, the court's optimism probably is misguided.
130 It is not immediately apparent why insurers should want to preserve trial by
jury; it would seem that they would fare better with judges. But it must be remembered
that the interest of the insurer is not revealed during trial. It is believed that the most
important thing to insurers is not the jury but the common-law trial, which is strongly
an emotional peg upon which to plead for retention of the status quo. In addition, jury
trial offers benefits to insurers. One of these is the chance to obscure the issues and win
on that basis in a marginal case; the same interest that the claimant has in such
a case. Furthermore, the use of a jury increases the chances for error fantastically. It is
very difficult to reverse the judgment of a judge sitting without a jury, but appellate
courts are only too willing to second-guess juries. And as noted earlier, the chance to
appeal is very much to the advantage of the insurer for reasons of delay and finandal
leverage. With regard to possible prejudice, the jury may only suspect that the defendant
is insured, while the judge usually would know it by reasons of the counsel appearing.
Lastly, insurers and their counsel seem genuinely to have convinced themselves that
"fault" and its trappings, including the jury, are so akin to religion that, lke religion,
they must be preserved.
131 Although defense attorneys, because of their dose relationships with insurers,
frequently are cast in the "bad guy" role, it should not be overlooked that claimants'
attorneys are at least as great incidental beneficiaries of the personal injury claims system,
and they are equally strident in its defense.
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covered by liability insurance in most personal injury suits, particu-
larly those arising from automobile accidents, insurers continue to
think it particularly important that juries and judges not know that a
particular defendant is insured. This concern really is not for the
welfare of the defendant, of course. In most cases in which the de-
fendant is insured, the insurer both provides the defense and is the
only loser in the event of an adverse judgment. It is the insurer, not
the insured, therefore, that is the real party in interest. Unless
it is assumed that juries and judges will disregard the rules of the
tort process, disclosure of the identity of the real party in interest
would seem harmless, while failure to do so would be unconscion-
able dissimulation. Even so, insurers have been successful in obtain-
ing rules and rulings that if the real party in interest is an insurance
company its identity may not be disclosed. The introduction of evi-
dence or the suggestion that the defendant is insured, unless it is
relevant on some ground other than his solvency, generally is held to
be so prejudicial and inflammatory that no instruction to disregard
it will suffice to avoid a mistrial or later reversal. 132 This rule may
be softening somewhat, however.133 A parallel development brought
on by the addition of liability insurance to the tort system is the rule
adopted by some courts that makes reversible error the disclosure
that the defendant is not insured, on the ground that in light of such
information the jury is less likely to return a plaintiff's verdict or to
132 In Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962), the rule
which prohibits reference to the defendant's insurance coverage was given as one reason
for not permitting liability insurance to cover awards of punitive damages, on the ground
that the rule which permits evidence of the financial standing of the defendant neces-
sarily would reveal his insurance coverage. The lengths to which courts carry the rule
is revealed in Jamison v. A.M. Byers Co., 330 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1964), in which a plain-
tiff's verdict in a death action was reversed on the sole ground that a written contract
relevant to the issue of liability which had been admitted in evidence and examined
by the jury revealed that the defendant corporate contractor had liability insurance
coverage. For undisclosed reasons the remedy imposed by the appellate court was remand
for new trial on the issue of damages only. Id. at 662.
The really surprising thing about the general rule is its survival in light of the
kinds of gross irrelevancies which usually are held by the courts to be cured by instruc-
tions to disregard.
See generally Anderson v. Mothershead, 19 Cal. App. 2d 97, 64 P.2d 995 (1937);
Wheeler v. Rudek, 397 III. 438, 74 N.E.2d 601 (1947); Anderson v. Enfield, 244 Minn. 474,
70 N.W.2d 409 (1955); Comment, Admissibility of Evidence of Insurance in Automobile
Negligence Actions, 19 WASH. & LEE L. Ray. 146 (1962).
133 See Muehlebach v. Mercer Mortuary & Chapel, Inc., 93 Ariz. 60, 378 P.2d 741
(1963); Anderson v. Enfield, 244 Minn. 474, 70 N.W.2d 409 (1955); Fannin, Disclosure of




make a high award of damages.134 Once again we see a rule that
assumes that the effect of insurance is to create a lawless jury.
This sort of thinking is carried to even greater lengths in the
rules that avoid anticipated prejudice by prohibiting claimants from
joining contract claims (such as that the claimant is a third-party
beneficiary of the policy) with tort claims, and by prohibiting joinder
of a liability or indemnity company as a defendant unless it is liable
by statute or contract to the plaintiff. 35 However effective these rules
once may have been, it seems likely that they are undone by the
pervasive assumption of insurance. The straightforward tactic of
telling the jury exactly what the insurance situation is would prob-
ably only remove the element of chance from whatever juries in fact
do with insurance information. 36
Another way in which insurance can affect juries both in their
makeup and their decisions is through its injection into the jury
selection process. A few well-chosen questions on voir dire aimed at
disclosing bias toward or against insurance companies quickly trans-
mit the suggestion that the defendant is insured to the veniremen,
and similar problems occur during trial in connection with the
examination of witnesses. The familiar supposition of prejudice has
divided the courts on the issue of whether to permit such examina-
tion. 37 A strange thing about the adoption of these non-disclosure
of insurance rules is that although distrust of the jury is at their
foundation, the good sense of the jury is the argument most fre-
quently advanced by insurers for preservation of the status quo.
Even if judges and juries are influenced by knowledge that an in-
surer will pay any judgment rendered, it does not follow that the
necessary remedy is to befog the insurance issue. (One equally effi-
cacious remedy would be to adopt an entirely different claims system
that would make "nondisclosure" unnecessary.)
134 Ex parte Jones, 160 Tex. 321, 325, 331 S.W.2d 202, 204 (1960); cf. White v.
Evansville American Legion Home Ass'n, 247 Ind. 69, 210 N.E.2d 845 (1965).
135 See the series: Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 157 (1954), 33
TEXAS L. Rav. 273 (1955); Gay, "Blindfolding" the Jury: Another View, 34 TEXAs L. R.v.
368 (1956); Green, A Rebuttal, 34 TEXAS L. Rav. 382 (1956); Gay, A Rejoinder, 34 TExXs
L. REv. 514 (1956); Green, A Reply to Mr. Gay's Rejoinder, 34 TEXAS L. Ray. 681 (1956).
136 15 DE PAUL L. RaV. 148, 157 (1965), suggests telling prospective jurors the in-
surance facts. Hoover v. Gregory, 253 N.C. 452, 117 S.E.2d 395 (1960), holds that it is not
error to do so. Another writer suggests simple abolition of evidentiary restrictions other
than relevance. Comment, supra note 132. See generally 24 Mss. L.J. 255 (1953).
137 See generally Langley v. Turner's Express, Inc., 375 F.2d 296 (4th Cir. 1967);
Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965); North v. Vinton, 17 Cal. App. 2d
214, 61 P.2d 950 (1936); Wheeler v. Rudek, 397 Ill. 438, 74 N.E.2d 601 (1947); 15
DE PAUL L. Rav. 148 (1965).
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Whether or not judges and juries actually become "lawless" to
the extent of returning higher verdicts even when an insurer is known
(rather than assumed) to be the real party in interest remains to be
verified. Two states, Wisconsin and Louisiana, have statutes permit-
ting direct action against insurers in most instances. It has been re-
ported that the result in Louisiana has been that the quantum of dam-
ages recovered for comparable harms is actually lower than in other
states, although the relative infrequency of jury trials in Louisiana
has been suggested as an explanation.18 However, the same result also
has been reported in federal court direct-action cases involving jury
trials in Louisiana.19 In Wisconsin, on the other hand, it was thought
by the Supreme Court at an early time that not only the effect of its
direct-action statute, but also its purpose, was to reveal the insurer
as real party in interest in order to increase the size of the damage
award.14° It has been suggested that this effect has been experienced and
also has resulted in an increase in insurance premium rates in Wis-
consin, although the existence of a comparative negligence doctrine
in Wisconsin may also be a factor.141 In truth there does not seem to
be any reliable evidence one way or the other, nor is there any real
certainty concerning what happens when the judge and jury only
assume that the defendant is insured. Nonetheless the assumption and
the fear of lawlessness persist.
Attention is not limited to trial courts. The insurance industry
with its enormous financial resources has had a great and largely
overlooked impact in the appellate courts. The effect of insurance
often is realized in the very decision to appeal, just as it is in the de-
cision to defend, since insurance companies, because their interests as
professional litigants transcend the facts of a particular case, may
appeal where even financially strong individual litigants would not.
It often is well worth an insurer's time and effort to obtain favorable
pronouncements on the law by appellate courts which thereafter will
serve as precedents as well as to fight specific trial court rulings that
threaten the industry's premium-loss ratios. In addition, persuading
an appellate court simply to review the facts and to second-guess the
138 See Lassiter, Direct Actions Against the Insurer, 1949 INs. L.J. 411.
139 Id. at 415. Apparently some attorneys feel that their chances for obtaining and
retaining higher awards of damages for claimants are better in the federal courts; if they
are correct, the direct-action statutes at least have had the frequent effect of making an
alternate forum available to claimants because of the diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts.
140 Bergstein v. Popkin, 202 Wis. 625, 633, 233 N.W. 572, 575 (1930).
141 See Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 MICH.
L. REv. 689 (1960).
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trial judge and jury by means of proximate cause and similar doctrines
may be relatively inexpensive if the increased risk of loss is slight and
the possible saving great because the potential recovery is thought to
be near the policy limits. Another important effect of appealing cases
is the effectuation of appellate control over the size of damage
awards. 42 Thus a substantial part of the employment of appellate
courts is directed solely to the service of the insurance industry.
Whether thought of as "procedure" or "substance," questions
concerning damages-the kinds of interests for which awards of money
should be recovered in court as well as the amounts of such awards-
have been emphasized greatly by the union of the tort process with
liability insurance. 143 An example is the damage award for conscious
physical pain and suffering. 44 Under the traditional principles of
the tort process alone, this is an interest for which an award may be
recovered in any amount decided on by the decision makers pro-
vided by the process, since no conceivable evidence could relate
physical pain to economic value in the context of market-determined
value. Although this may be an acceptable (if debatable) rule in a
personal injury claims system that does not have a liability insurance
component, it becomes more difficult to accept when the insurance
ingredient is added. From the insurers' standpoint it is an actuarial
nightmare. From that of the public interest the question is raised
whether the insurer or the injured person himself is the better dis-
tributor of this risk of harm. The insurer is the better distributor
only if the loss may be spread through an insurance pool composed
of people among whom it is thought to be "fair" to spread it. It is
clear that these conditions are not present in connection with much
activity that creates risks of physical pain and suffering to others;
the cost is spread to the public at large through higher premium
payments. The only tenable theory for retaining the award beyond
an amount necessary to relieve pain is that the ostensible shifting
of such losses indirectly pays the claimant's expenses of litigation,
which expenses otherwise would reduce more legitimate items of dam-
ages. Aside from the absence of any necessary correspondence be-
tween the amount of the award and the amount of collection expense,
142 See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 904 (1951), and discussion in Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of
Insurance, 18 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 219 (1953). See also Conklin, Appellate Courts and
the Quest for Just Compensation Additur and Remittitur, 42 N.D.L. REv. 397 (1966).
143 See Williams, How Do Insurance Companies View Damages?, 38 Wis. B. Bu.t.
14 (1965).
144 See generally Kujawa v. Baltimore Transit Co., 224 Md. 195, 167 A.2d 96 (1961);
Jaffe, supra note 142; Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 COLUM. L. 'REV. 476
(1959).
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this argument alone might suffice to recommend its retention. It
would be more persuasive if it were not a simultaneous general prin-
ciple of the system to refuse to permit the shifting of litigation costs
directly.145
Another question concerning damages is how liability insurance
does and should relate to awards of so-called punitive damages. If it
is assumed that the rules of the tort process deter conduct, an ob-
jection to insurability is obvious: Since the burden of paying falls
on the shoulders of the insurer, not the insured, it does not deter the
conduct that gave rise to the award.146 Thus on grounds of public
policy some courts have refused to permit the insured indemnity for
judgments awarding punitive damages.147 It is relevant of course to
ask if punitive damages or damages of any kind really do serve a
deterrent function. They may deter the particular defendant (al-
though the failure of more severe criminal sanctions to achieve much
of a reduction in the crime rate makes this questionable),148 but be-
cause civil verdicts are not much publicized it is doubtful that they
have much of what Professor Calabresi refers to as a "general deter-
rence"' 49 effect. In any event, we usually assume that if a defendant
is not insured he is insolvent for practical purposes. If this is cor-
rect, refusal to permit insurance coverage does not enhance deter-
rence of any kind, but simply deprives the claimant of this element
of damages. To the extent that he might have looked to this source
for payment of litigation expenses, he is further frustrated. Some
courts, noting this, have required the insurer to pay a punitive dam-
age award.15° It is perhaps too facile, however, to assume that so
long as the "deterrence" policy ground is absent, as it surely is in
145 In Connecticut, awards of punitive damages are specifically designed to pay
litigation expenses and may not exceed them, less taxable costs. See Tedesco v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 857 (1941), and discussion of punitive damages therein.
148 One wonders why this argument apparently is not as significant when an ad-
mittedly guilty tortfeasor is given one of the many immunities referred to in text at
pp. 671-74 supra.
147 See Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 343 (1968). Theoretically this could be accomplished as
well by construing the language of the policy, but the courts generally have not been
sympathetic to insurers' claims of this kind. When they have precluded coverage, it has
usually been on the ground of the policy referred to in the text. American Surety Co.
v. Gold, 875 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966). Contra, Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins.
Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 883 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
148 Cf. Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 689, 883 S.W.2d 1
(1964).
149 See text at pp. 669-71 supra for discussion of deterrence in connection with the
discussion of what liability insurance has done to tort doctrine.
150 E.g., Pennsylvania T. & F. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th




the case of solely vicarious liability such as respondeat superior for
punitive damages,' 51 liability insurance automatically should be per-
mitted or required to cover the award. The considerations mentioned
above in connection with damages awards for pain and suffering apply
to punitive damages as well, with the additional consideration that
the award is not designed to compensate and is of dubious efficacy
for any other purpose.152
The effect of liability insurance on the punitive damages doc-
trine is likely to be even greater in the future. Needless to say, in-
surers actively oppose the principle of punitive damages. Unless re-
quired to provide complete coverage by statute,153 most exclude puni-
tive damages from policy coverage. 54 The 1966 standard compre-
hensive general liability policy appears to attempt such exclusion in-
directly by covering only accidents not intended by the insured.155
If "gross negligence" and "reckless" conduct can be converted to
"intentional" conduct, it appears that, as to punitive damages, in-
surance as a means of providing a financially responsible defendant
has been eliminated indirectly. But to the extent that courts con-
tinue to hold insurers liable for any punitive damages, their public
relations and litigation staffs can be expected to persist in the effort
to obtain abandonment of the doctrine itself.156 They have good rea-
son for wanting it abandoned apart from the chance that they might
have to pay punitive damages awards. The doctrine is employed by
claimants' attorneys as a tactical device, ostensibly to bring before
the jury outrageous facts that might entitle their clients to punitive
damages awards, but actually in order to play upon the emotions of
151 Ohio Gas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied,
295 U.S. 734 (1935).
152 See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HAav. L. REv. 1173 (1931).
153 See Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 320, 333 (1968), citing Wheeler v. O'Connell, 297 Mass.
549, 9 N.E.2d 544 (1937) and cases following it; Md. Cas. Co. v. Baker, 304 Ky. 296, 200
S.W.2d 757 (1947). Should "uninsured motorist" coverage include punitive damages?
In Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964), the court held that
it did not. The case was subsequently overruled by statute. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 46-750.31(4)
(Supp. 1968).
154 See Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 320, 329 (1968).
155 Ghiardi, Liability Insurance Protection From Punitive Damages, 8 FoR TIM
DEFENSE (Defense Memo) (Apr. 1967).
156 Although the adoption of the "deterrence" theory of insurer non-liability is a
tribute to such efforts, its full significance cannot be appreciated until one asks why
liability insurance for "compensatory" damages does not also eliminate the assumed
deterrent effect of tort rules. If the premise is not questioned too closely and if the
other assumed functions of "compensatory" damages are not weighed too heavily, the
insurers' logic could put them out of business. For a representative insurers' view, see
id.
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jurors to enhance the compensatory damages award even if no award
of punitive damages is made. The punitive damages doctrine has lit-
tle in reason to support it, particularly when it is used in conjunction
with liability insurance. The insurers may be right in their push to
abandon the doctrine, but, as usual, for the wrong reasons from the
standpoint of the public interest.157
An additional effect of insurance is on the way in which dam-
ages are paid. The tort process decrees that damages be paid in per-
haps the worst way possible in most cases-in lump sum. Yet the
need is for periodic payment at times when needed. 58 Periodic pay-
ment is actively opposed by insurers, and the increased cost to them
of a periodic-payment rule suggests their motives.
Probably the most significant effect of liability insurance on
money damages is that in practical effect it has eliminated both the
tort damage rules and the policies behind them in the vast majority
of personal injury cases. Although the tort rules envision an all-or-
nothing recovery of damages, the addition of insurance converts the
system to "part-recovery most-of-the-time."'159 And this new system
is further refined since such recovery is confined by the limits of the
defendant's policy. As Professor Conard has pointed out, this com-
monly restricts settlement in over ninety percent of the personal
injury cases in which claims are made to "an amount that is con-
sumed by less than a year of hospitalization."'10 This may be almost
inevitable under a tort-insurance regime. Insurers have only one in-
terest and only one way in which to relate to the system-money. Be-
cause of this, the language of the marketplace has come to be the
language of tort theory. One assumes that not all human interests
157 On the subject of punitive damages generally, see Long, Insurance Protection
Against Punitive Damages, 32 TENN. L. Ray. 573 (1965); Morris, supra note 152; Williams,
Pain and Suffering-A Practical Approach, 19 OKLA. L. REy. 269 (1966); Comment, In-
surer's Liability for Punitive Damages, 14 Mo. L. REv. 175 (1949); Comment, Automobile
Liability Insurance and Punitive Damages, 39 TEmPLE L.Q. 459 (1966); Note, Insurance
Coverage and the Punitive Award in the Automobile Accident Suit, 19 U. Prrr. L. REv.
144 (1957); Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 320 (1968); Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 343 (1968).
Related problems concern the obligation of insurers to defend actions against their
insureds for intentional torts. See Comment, Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend Suits for
Intentional Injury, 24 WAsH. & LEE L. RaV. 271 (1967). For coverage problems, see
Gonsoulin, Is an Award of Punitive Damages Covered Under an Automobile or Com-
prehensive Liability Policy?, 22 Sw. L.J. 433 (1968); 43 TsxAs L. Rlv. 802 (1965).
Regarding the problem of damages awards for death from unlawful conduct, see 13 S.
D.L. REv. 239 (1968).
158 Kimball, supra note 5, at 10.
159 See Franklin, Chanin & Mark, supra note 8, at 32.
160 Conard, supra note 13, at 296.
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are expressable in these terms,1 1 but to the extent they are not, the
existing system may be incapable of protecting them.
Insurance also has had considerable influence on pleading pro-
cedures in the courts. In pre-insurance days pleaders were concerned
primarily to state "a cause of action" as judged by tort doctrinal re-
quirements. Although pleading requirements have not been aban-
doned, the real problem of the modern pleader is to draw a com-
plaint that states a cause of action covered by the defendant's insur-
ance policy.162 Thus, for example, even if the plaintiff's cause of
action at common law would have been for battery, the pleading
may take an altogether different turn on the same facts if the defend-
ant's policy excludes coverage for intentional torts. Of course, the
plaintiff is also interested in the amount of defendant's coverage. Al-
though both solvency and the terms of insurance coverage would
have been irrelevancies in the early tort process, procedures have
been modified in several jurisdictions to make both facts discover-
able prior to trial, to aid in pleading and pretrial negotiation,163 to
determine the existence of liability insurance for preparation of ques-
tions on voir dire,1 64 and to allow further discovery of investigative
reports and the like.16 5 The majority of jurisdictions, however, adhere
to the old rules. 66 Insurers have been less than enthusiastic about
these developments, but concern for their own interests has led to use
of some interesting pleading procedures by insurance counsel. Since
the tort process requires that few pleadings be under oath, the way has
161 See id. at 282, where the author points out that "[tjhe results of the new research
make it possible to view injury treatment as a problem of human suffering and depriva-
tion, rather than as a problem of tort theory, judicial administration, or professional
ethics."
162 See generally Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 320, 323 (1968).
163 See Goldenberg v. Wolfe, 44 F.R.D. 17 (D.C. Conn. 1967) (permitting discovery
under state statute for the purpose, inter alia, of determining if there was coverage
for punitive damages); Cook v. Welty, 258 F. Supp. 875 (D.D.C. 1966); Ellis v. Gilbert,
19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P-2d 39 (1967). An amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure proposed by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States would permit discovery of "the existence and contents
of any insurance agreement ..... Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2), 43 F.R.D. 211,
225 (1967).
164 Muck v. Claflin, 197 Kan. 594, 419 P.2d 1017 (1966).
165 Slomberg v. Pennabaker, 42 F.R.D. 8 (M.D. Pa. 1967).
166 Haney v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 330 F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1964). On the subject
of discovery of insurance generally, see Divilbiss, Current Problems in Pleading, Discovery
and Settlements, 31 Mo. L. REv. 5 (1966); Kircher, Discovery of Insurance Policy Limits,
8 FoR THE DEFENSE (Defense Memo) (Nov. 1967); Stopher, Should A Change Be Made
In Discovery Rules To Permit Inquiry As To Limits Of Liability Insurance?, 85 INs.
COUNSEL J. 53 (1968); 5 WAsHBuRN L.J. 270 (1966); Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 822 (1968).
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been left open for employment by insurers of sham defenses and
denials of matters as to which there is no dispute for the purpose of
delay and increase of expense to the claimant, both of which can be
weathered much better by insurers than by claimants. Oddly enough
these practices are most refined in suits on the policy brought by the
insured himself or by a claimant. It is not unusual for an insurer to
deny coverage by pleading the applicability of every single exclusion-
ary clause in the policy, leaving it to the plaintiff to prove, for exam-
ple, that an allegedly covered automobile accident injury did not
result from a hazard of war.
Another procedural area touched by insurance, that of calendar
control, also should be considered. It frequently is alleged that lia-
bility insurance is responsible for bringing the tort process to a virtual
halt in many courts. Critics blame not only the abstract influence of
insurance but also insurers themselves for the widely reported con-
gestion of the courts. Although congestion is for the most part a
serious problem only in the large metropolitan centers (and this
alone makes it a serious national problem), there is evidence that
cases in which an insurer is the real party in interest contribute
heavily to congestion, wherever it exists.167 Once cases are docketed,
insurers demand juries more frequently than other classes of litigants
do,168 increasing congestion and delay. As population increases the
amount of litigation naturally should be expected to increase pro-
portionately. Yet the growing volume of discussion and smatterings
of statistical proof concerning mountainous litigation backlogs sug-
gest that we are becoming a disproportionately litigious people.
One explanation is the ever-increasing availability or assumed avail-
ability of a financially responsible defendant through insurance. Al-
though litigiousness itself may be unobjectionable, if insurance has
the effect of first promoting the institution of tort litigation, then
delaying its disposition, the public, which both pays the largest share
of the bill for the costs of so-called private litigation and ultimately
bears the brunt of failure of the courts to perform, has a vital inter-
est in knowing about it and in seeking solutions.
Even though it would be a mistake to exaggerate the fact of
congestion and delay in the courts, and whether or not insurers are
deliberately responsible for such as there is or for the massive and
complicated network of negligence doctrines employed in the courts,
167 A. LMN & E. WOOLLEY, DISPATCH AND DELAY 13-14 (1961); Rosenberg & Sovern,
Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation, 59 CoLum. L. REV. 1115 (1959).
168 Cf. LuN & WooLEY, supra note 167, at 397.
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congestion, delay, and complexity undoubtedly work to their advan-
tage and to the corresponding disadvantage of policyholders and
claimants. For one example, although insurers earn interest on the
money that they hold between premium collection and claim pay-
ment, a claimant often must borrow money to replace lost wages
while his claim is unpaid. Professor Conard has suggested that in-
surers be required to pay successful claimants the actual interest paid
by them in such cases, rather than the usual "legal rate."1 69 Other
solutions can be suggested. Under the present legal rules of the tort
process, insurers have as much right to use the court system and to
demand juries as individual litigants, but this is not a logical neces-
sity. If the combination of tort process and liability insurance has
produced a system in which insurers are permitted to pervert and
impede the procedures and purposes of the tort process in order to
amass private profit, surely some remedy is available.170
VI
MARKETING, CLAIMS, AND PUBLIC RELATIONS: CONFLICrs
WITH THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Our principal concern to this point has been with the ways in
which liability insurance and the tort process interact to form a per-
sonal injury claims system and with the kind of system they form.
We have seen how the interests of insurers in maximizing profits
affect the system in regard both to the determination of liability and
the actual availability of protection to one who has purchased a
liability policy. But obviously this does not exhaust the interest of
the public in the system. To the extent that the assumption of the
general availability of insurance is basic to the operation of the sys-
tem, the public is interested in having it actually available, and at a
cost that the public can afford. It is interested in the social conse-
quences of loss-shifting, and in the manner in which the system
touches individual lives. The public also is interested in accurate
feedback concerning the operation of the system for purposes of
evaluation. The depth of these interests becomes clearer as the in-
surance industry comes under the closer scrutiny of lawmakers,
journalists and other critics. Although no doubt some criticism
169 Letter from Alfred F. Conard to the Editor, in 3 TRIAL 2 (Apr.-May 1967).
170 See GanEN, supra note 66, at 87-101.
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is merely scapegoating, many insurance company practices are open
to serious question when viewed from the standpoint of the public
interests mentioned.
Looking at these briefly, we should consider first the question
of the actual availability of insurance. It seems to be becoming less
available. In order to advance their financial interests, automobile
liability insurers have begun to compete fiercely to insure only "pre-
ferred risk" drivers-people between thirty and fifty years of age with
good driving records (about thirty percent of the driving popula-
tion). The result is that persons who are not "preferred risks," and
this includes many of the more economically unfortunate members
of our society,171 racial and ethnic minorities, the very young and
the very old, increasingly find themselves unable to obtain insurance,
or find their contracts cancelled, or find that they cannot renew. 7 2
These results are not limited to the downtrodden. It is reported that
a number of insurers have ceased writing professional liability insur-
ance for accountants, and that those who continue to do so have
raised premium rates drastically. 7 3 Military personnel also are the
victims of discrimination. Nor are the grounds for cancellation uni-
formly related to the risk of the venture. In one recent case the pro-
fessional liability coverage of a physician was cancelled because he
testified under subpoena against another physician who was covered
by the same insurer. 7 4 One insurer has demonstrated the irration-
ality of discrimination against all male drivers under twenty-five by
developing an effective rating plan for that group which includes psy-
chological testing for attitudinal maturity. 75 Testimony before Con-
gress revealed that another company with only four rating classifi-
171 The problems of the poor with respect to property insurance recently have been
well documented. See generally REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CrviL DISORDERS, ch. 14 (1968); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL ADVISORY PANEL ON
INSURANCE IN RIoT-AFFECTED AREAS (1967); Ribicoff, Federal Role in Riot Insurance Pro-
tection, 4 TRIAL 25 (Apr.-May 1968).
172 For one view of these problems, see Ghiardi & Wienke, Recent Developments in
the cancellation, Renewal and Rescission of Automobile Insurance Policies, 51 MAR-
QuETmE L. REv. 219 (1967). See also The Business With 103 Million Unsatisfied Customers,
TIME, Jan. 26, 1968, at 20. The list could be expanded to divorcees, unemployed persons,
painters-anyone who may be "unstable." Ridgeway, No Risks Preferred, NEw REPUBLIC,
Feb. 22, 1969, at 18.
173 Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1966, at 13, col. 5.
174 L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968); 47 TExAs L.
REv. 152 (1968).
175 Haner, Anticipating the Bad Driver, in CARS, DRIvERS, AND ACCIDENTS: THE EN'i-
RONMENT OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 45 (Wickerman ed. 1966).
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cations and which never cancels a policyholder on grounds of age
has not experienced an underwriting loss in forty-three years.1 76
Under the pressure of federal investigation, members of the National
Underwriters Association and the National Bureau of Casualty Un-
derwriters (now the Insurance Rating Board), insuring about forty
percent of the nation's insured drivers, began in 1968 to modify their
cancellation policies, limiting their grounds to non-payment of pre-
miums and to suspension of driver's license or auto registration, and
limiting cancellation for misrepresentation to the sixty-day period fol-
lowing issuance of a policy.
The risk classifications made by insurers largely are without
statistical foundation-they are simply the insurers' hunches concern-
ing desirable risks. Because automobiles or other vehicles rather than
persons are the insured units under most automobile liability poli-
cies, insurers do not have enough information upon which to make
such risk judgments.17 7 Most of them do not seriously claim that
their classifications are anything but arbitrary. But they are prof-
itable. When insurance policies are modified to exclude certain kinds
of risks, the premium seldom is lowered. In New Jersey this led the
insurance commissioner to prohibit certain exclusions.178
Those unable to insure otherwise must insure if at all with "high
risk" automobile insurers which have sprung up to take advantage
of the high premium rates usually permitted for such risks. Many of
these insurers have failed financially in recent years, causing suffer-
ing to both claimants and insureds. When this happens policyholders
sometimes find themselves both unprotected and assessed to meet
the liabilities of the company 7 9 A problem similar to that of in-
solvency arises when there are multiple claimants against an insured
whose aggregate claims exceed the policy limits. The problem arises
in part from the concept of the limited policy, just as the insolvency
problem arises from the concept of an entity with limited financial
resources. If the insurer pays someone his full claim, someone else
does not get paid. The same may be true if the insurer settles some
of the claims, but not others.180 One solution would be simply to let
176 Mintz, Auto Insurance Industry Takes in 12, Pays Out $1, The Austin Texas
Statesman, July 29, 1968, at 23.
177 Ridgeway, supra note 172, at 18.
178 See 2 TxaS. 22 (Aug.-Sept. 1966).
179 See Dedman, The Insolvent Insurance Company Problem, 8 FoR THE DEFENsE
25 (Apr. 1967).
180 See YKETON & O'CONNEL at 38-39; Comment, Distribution of a Limited Insurance
Fund to Multiple Claimants, 22 LA. L. Ray. 214 (1961).
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the insurer settle as many claims as possible. Another alternative is
a rule precluding exhaustion of the fund by settlement, together with
priorities in chronological order of judgment or simply pro rata.
The former puts a premium on simple and thus quickly-disposed-of
claims, which may give the insurer a windfall, while the latter may
be very slow. Both may burden the courts unduly. As in many other
areas of life touched by liability insurance, the ability of insurers to
limit their liability to the face amount of the policy places great
strain on the public purposes of the claims system. It is for this rea-
son that recent insurance reform proposals have included unlimited
liability policies.' 8 '
Insurer refusal to insure many risks, translated as "inability" to
do so, also is used as a means of applying pressure for rate increases
with state regulatory bodies. The subterfuge often is successful. Pre-
mium rates for all risks, established on the basis of industry-provided
figures, seem to have increased at rates which are alarming to per-
sons of modest means, although insurers continue to show profits
when investment as well as underwriting experience is considered. 82
The true financial picture often is difficult to ascertain both because
of the reticence of insurers in making the financial situation known
and of the intricacy of their accounting principles when they do.
The growing phenomenon of difficulty in obtaining liability insurance
underlines the point that insurance does not distribute the costs of
torts unless a policy has been issued and the policy covers the tort.
As simple as it is, this point is easy to overlook. 83
Insurers have not been much more eager to pioneer in the devel-
opment of new kinds of coverage-liability or accident-or new mar-
keting techniques that would better serve the public. 8 4 Something
181 The AIA proposal referred to in text at pp. 697-98 infra includes unlimited
coverage as to total dollar amounts, with a limit on recoverable benefits in any given
month.
182 See note 18 supra. Sharply increased automobile repair bills and doctors' bills
have been attributed to the easy availability of insurance money. Whether or not there
is a causal connection is difficult to know. At the time of this writing the cost of living
generally has been rising for several years. On the other hand, insurers also have been
faulted for encouraging the use of unsafe autos by reason of their niggardly appraise-
ment and repair allowance practices.
183 See, eg., James, supra note 86, at 552 & n.5.
184 IsoN, supra note 3, at 215-16. Professor Ison attributes the development of tort
liability to failure to develop accident insurance coverage. Id. at 44. For an example of
one possible change, note that although dealers find it advantageous to require each
automobile purchaser to obtain collision coverage at the time of purchase, we as a
society have not yet seen fit to use the same marketing technique to require the purchase
of liability coverage with the purchase of every car. Friedman, Taken for a Ride, NEw
Ra tuuc, May 25, 1968, at 18.
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more akin to fear of an uncertain future than to complacence with
the present situation seems to motivate the insurance industry to
resist change, even in the face of mounting criticism, although the
status quo does serve the industry well.18 5 There has been little
imaginative effort in the development of insurance that will answer
such criticism. The political efforts of claimants' attorneys probably
have resulted in greater changes in coverage and policy limits-
through legislative action-than have voluntary insurer actions. Al-
though there is an actuarial base of sorts for the present coverages,
there obviously would be none for new kinds. This, of course, would
present significant marketing problems in the realm of risk classi-
fication and premium rating. These problems, however, probably do
not fully explain the reluctance to innovate. As usual, the explana-
tion is to be found in threatened profits. Many of these problems
could be surmounted by the use of some kind of group insurance.
This has proved workable in the area of automobile rentals, where
the lessor obtains insurance to cover lessees who individually are
uninsurable.18 6 There is good reason to believe that opposition to
group liability insurance by independent insurance agents and by
insurers who fear invasion of insurance markets by companies now
selling in or easily capable of moving into the group field has been
responsible for much of the paralysis. 8 7
185 One view of the approach of the insurance industry to change is found in GREN,
supra note 66, at 83:
It is interesting to observe the attitude of the insurance carriers and those who
speak for them towards any suggestion to change the status quo. Most of them
oppose compulsory liability insurance; they oppose being brought out in the
open as litigants though they are the real parties at interest and enjoy an im-
munity denied to any other litigant, individual or corporate; they belittle the
need and efforts to find a better solution; they oppose the development of
something akin to workmens' compensation or other utilization of the insurance
principle. They seem to think they have a proprietary interest in liability
insurance; that it is their money that is involved; and that the advantages
gained from the difficulties in administering negligence law are for their special
benefit and should not be changed to meet the problems of the day. Sometimes
they even imply, if not openly charge, that substitutes proposed are communistic
in origin and purpose. In short they seem perfectly satisfied with things as
they are. In this attitude they are of course no different from any other group
invested with the privilege to profit from a public service.
186 LEWISTON, supra note 18, at 76-77.
187 See Kemper, The Basic Protection Plan: Reform or Regression? in CPass 99, 108;
Mass Merchandising Shakes Insurance Establishment, TRu, Apr.-May, 1968, at 57. For
another example of an application of group liability insurance, see Denenberg & Murray,
The Market for Attorneys Group Malpractice Insurance-A Case Study, 73 CASE : COM.
9 (Sept.-Oct. 1968). Group automobile policies now are prohibited in 34 states, according
to testimony offered before the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee. The Austin Texas
Statesman, July 29, 1968, at 23. Cf. id., Nov. 14, 1968, at 3.
The Defense Research Institute attack on the AIA automobile insurance plan
PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS SYSTEM
One development to which insurers have been able to point with
some real basis for pride has been "advance payment" techniques by
means of which claimants against an insured are given a rather size-
able immediate cash payment in cases of personal injury in which
the insurer thinks the claimant has a valid legal claim.18 8 Although
the formalization of this procedure is novel, quick payment when
the insured clearly is at fault is not. Nor are the advance payment
plans without their own defects. 89 Also, the first party insurance
principle has achieved some extension in the creation of a coverage
that pays an insured victim of a tortfeasor with low insurance cov-
erage the difference between the amount of the insured's personal
injury and the tortfeasor's insurance limits.190
Quite recently the members of one of the large national groups
of stock liability underwriters, the American Insurance Association,
voluntarily began sponsorship of a shift away from the liability con-
cept of insurance for automobile accident victims toward a kind of
compulsory first party or accident insurance covering the victim
rather than the person who harmed him. Although the proposal
retains a few of the questionable aspects of the existing insurance sys-
tem, its adoption would create immunity from tort law (and thus
would divorce tort law from insurance) in the automobile area, and it
appears to be a very attractive answer to the current difficulties with
automobile-related claims. 191 Predictably, it has been met with im-
mentioned in the text includes the following statement, which makes the basis for the
opposition of the non-AIA segment of the industry clear. One may wonder why AIA
affirms an auto compensation plan which is, in effect, compulsory accident and disability
insurance. One insurance executive [the Kemper cited above] has alleged that marketing
factors are a prime reason. He stated:
The AIA automobile insurance plan... lends itself from a marketing and pro-
cedural standpoint to a group approach. It seems fair to suggest that one
motive strongly influencing members of the AIA Executive Committee, which
are the giants in their own organization, is the marketing potential for tying
their present group writings directly into the new automobile insurance system
they propose.
DEFENSE RESEARCri INSTITUTE, INc., SPECIAL REPORT, AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 7 (1969).
188 See generally Deschamps, Advance Payment Techniques, 7 FoR THE DEFENSE 57
(1966); Young, New Ideas for Personal Injury Claim Settlements, 8 FOR THE DEFENSE 141
(1967); TIME, July 19, 1968, at 65; Robinson & Due, Advance Payments-Problems in
Practice and Procedure, 35 INS. COUNSEL J. 444 (1968).
189 For discussion of the drawbacks of one such plan, see O'Connell, The Road
Ahead: For Automobile Insurance, 1 CONN. L. REv. 22, 30-31 (1968).
190 See Moore, Extended Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 9 FOR THE DEFENSE 57 (1968).
191 For details, see AMERICAN INSURANcE ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF SPECIAL CoMmrrrFE
TO STUDY AND EVALUATE THE KEETON-O'CoNNELL BAsIc PRoTEcTION PLAN AND AUTOMOBILE
AccENT REPARATIONS (1968); Jones, 'No-Fault' Auto Insurance: Reply to Critics, Wall St.
J., Dec. 24, 1968, at 6, col. 3; TIm, Nov. 1, 1968, at 94; AI.A. Announces No-Fault Auto
Plan, 9 FoR THE DEFENSE 66 (1968). In a Pavlovian response, the Defense Research Insti-
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mediate and vigorous denunciation by industry spokesmen, 1 2 as well
as rejection by the American Bar Association. 193
The next major area of public concern to be considered is that
of claims practice. Usually when an insured reports a collision to his
insurer or notifies the insurer of a claim against himself, the claims
department assigns a claim adjustor or investigator to the case. He
may be an employee of the insurer, an employee of an independent
contractor, or an independent contractor. He usually has authority
to pay a claimant up to a sum specified by his principal. His job is to
obtain the facts, to evaluate them, and if necessary to dispose of the
matter through compromise and the execution of a release by the
claimant. 94 If this proves to be impossible, and if the claimant files
suit, the claim and investigation file are assigned to an attorney em-
ployed by the insurer for the defense of its insureds, who then evalu-
ates the case and recommends a course of action.19 5 This recommenda-
don is made to the insurer, not to the insured. Although the defense
attorney is provided ostensibly for the insured, his contacts with the
insured usually are very limited. He may see the insured for further
investigation of the claim, if necessary, or when the claim is in excess
of policy limits, or in the courtroom. He frequently fails even to
advise him of the outcome of the case, whether it is tried to conclu-
sion or settled.196
The availability of insurance company money has led to increased
prosperity for attorneys; prosperity has attracted better minds to this
facet of the profession, and this in turn has led to better preparation
tute, Inc., a non-profit corporation, issued an "Analysis and Critique" attacking the AIA
proposal. In it God, the Constitution, individuality, a conception of fault akin to that
of original sin, and the complete high school debater's repertoire are called upon in
support of the status quo. In the opinion of the writer the document goes a long way
towards proving the thesis of this article.
192 DRI Board Opposes All No-Fault Plans, 9 FOR Tm DEFENSE 73 (1968); TzME,
Nov. 1, 1968, at 94.
193 37 U.S.L.W. 2441 (1969).
194 For an insider's view of current claims-adjusting practice, see generally R. CON-
STANTIN, SUE oR SEm (1968).
195 The legal representatives for the insurance companies are compensated time-
wise. Continued retainer relationship is predicated upon success in resisting
recovery. All claims are evaluated by experienced and knowledgeable home-office
personnel, and reserves accordingly are entered upon the ledgers. The ratio
between eventual disbursements and the reserves is the measure of the worth
of the attorney to the company. The principle is as simple as the calculation of
a batting average.
LEWISTON, supra note 18, at 10.
196 A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATr, JR., C. VOLTz & R. BoMBAuGH, AuToMoBaL
ACCIDENT CosTS AND PAYMENTS 296-99 (1964) [hereinafter cited as CONARD].
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and more skillful representation of clients' interests. 1 7 Unfortunately,
it also has led to an antagonistic dichotomy within the legal pro-
fession. The influence of the insurers' business interests has affected
insurance defense counsel, many of whom develop such antipathy
to all claimants that they refuse to represent them under any cir-
cumstances.198 This attitude works to the benefit of the insurer, and
may incidentally benefit the insured. In most instances the insured
receives a more skillful attorney, and at a cost (the premium) far less
than if he had to hire an attorney directly to represent him in this
situation. The higher the policy limits, the more vigorous and skillful
the attorney is likely to be. The problem, as we have seen earlier, is
that very often the skill of the insurer-employed attorney is devoted
to interests adverse to those of his ostensible client. 199
Public relations considerations of a particular insurer greatly in-
fluence its claims practice. Some insurers believe it best to settle almost
all claims, while others refuse to pay in most cases unless suit is filed.
Whatever the motivations of insurers, studies by the Columbia Com-
mittee, 100 by Morris and Paul,201 and by Conard et al.,202 summarized
by Keeton and O'Connell,2 0 3 all reveal that claimants tend to be
overpaid when the amounts of their claims are relatively small and
underpaid when their claims are large. This effect is due in large
part to the interest of insurers in disposing of small claims, even un-
founded ones, at inflated costs, 20 4 and in denying liability and refus-
ing to pay anything in the large cases whose impact on the premium-
loss ratio would be extreme. The hoped-for net result is a smaller
aggregate payout. Of course, it is the large claims which represent
the more serious social problems.
If the personal injury claims system is of any importance to the
197 See GREN, supra note 66, at 78-79.
198 See LEwISTON, supra note 18, at 81. It may be extreme, but not too much so, to
say that the plaintiff and his lawyer "are objects of hatred to the insurer, its adjuster,
and its counsel." Id. at 37.
199 Liability insurance company claims procedures are briefly summarized in Lxvlu
WOOLLEY, supTra note 167, at 394-97. For an excellent and succinct description of the
attorney's role in tort litigation, see C. MoRRsS, TORTS § 1 (1953). For a summary of
English claims practice, see ISON, supra note 3, at 109-16.
200 REPORT BY THE COMMrITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION OR AUTOMOBILE AcciDENTs TO
TiE COLUMBIA UNrvEmsrrY COUNCIL FOR RFEA CH IN TmE SOCAL. ScIEcNs 63 (1932).
201 Morris & Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L.
REv. 913, 917, 921 (1962).
202 CoNARD, supra note 196, at 197.
203 KEETON & O'CONNELL at 84-69.
204 See LEwIsToN, supra note 18, at 10. Although the usual automobile and general
liability policy puts settlement in the hands of the insurer, many professional malpractice
policies require the approval of the insured prior to settlement.
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public welfare, it follows that the actual dispositions that insurers
make of tort claims are of crucial importance. It is for this reason
largely that the effects of claims practice have so attracted the atten-
tion of reformers. At the same time, the general public also has
begun to take an interest in the manner in which claims are handled
on a day-to-day basis. There seems to be a growing revulsion toward
what has been referred to as the "poker table mentality"2 5 which
many consider characteristic of the practitioners in the personal in-
jury claims area: The object of the tort game is simply to win (or save)
as much money as possible. 20 8 This pervasive mentality underlies
odious investigative practices, interminable delay, and high-pressure
settlement tactics. It is responsible for "package" settlements which
are negotiated for the benefit of insurers and attorneys alone, despite
the merits of the cases settled.207  It is blamed for trickery in the
courtroom. There can be little doubt that it plays a large role in
outright deception, such as is often involved in ensuring settlement
of the claim of an injured minor by deliberately securing appoint-
ment of an attorney ad litem for him who, because of financial need
or other reasons, is unlikely to question the propriety or terms of
any settlement the insurer asks a court to approve.
Despite all these shortcomings, it is in the arena of public
debate concerning their role that insurers have shown themselves at
their worst. For whether or not liability insurance actually is becom-
ing conceptually repugnant to the public interest, the industry ineptly
has done almost everything that could be done to make it appear
to be by demonstrating a complete disdain for the welfare of the
public at large. In my opinion this has been in large part the result
of permitting ill-informed public relations men and members of the
bar who have a financial interest in the status quo to speak for
the industry on matters of such great public concern. 208 The tragedy
is that the public positions these people have taken all too often have
come to be the policies of the industry. Claimants' and defendants'
attorneys associations have also taken public positions in behalf of
their own special interests, which are frequently at odds with the
interests of both the premium-paying and potential-victim public.209
The interests of attorneys may well run counter to those of the in-
dustry as well, although the industry apparently does not recognize
205 Kimball, supra note 5, at 19.
206 Id. at 19-20.
207 See LEwISTON, supra note 18, at 88.
208 Cf. Sharp, Remarks, in CRisis 254, 257.
209 See KEETON & O'CONNELL at 4. Examples are too numerous to mention.
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it. Well-planned and financed publicity campaigns by these groups
and by the industry have attempted to influence and persuade the
public, the bar, the potential jurors, and even the judiciary that
substantive and procedural rules that advance their interests should
be adopted, or, as is more often the case, retained.210 At times efforts
to influence the courts have become so flagrant that attempts (un-
successful) have been made to halt them by court action.211 It is diffi-
cult fully to assess the actual effect of such public relations, activities, 212
but as mentioned earlier the existence of limitations on liability
such as guest statutes and the persistent defeat of most reform at-
tempts testify to the potency of the industry in the legislatures.2 13
The disproportionate influence of liability insurance on the system
becomes dearer when it is recalled that many legislators are lawyers
who derive substantial income from the existing claims system,
and that the courts have traditionally shown deference to "legislative
wisdom."
A good example of public relations ineptitude is in the area of
safety promotion where insurers, albeit in their own interests, can in
fact point to some real accomplishments. Nonetheless, certain of
their spokesmen have given credence to the charge that instead of
supporting federally-sponsored safety measures the insurance indus-
try has opposed them in fear of "socialistic" government action.2 14
If the industry is opposed to strong federal government it could
certainly find a better issue on which to fight the question. Not only
does it lose credit to which it is entitled, but in bemoaning federal
regulation it exposes one of its most vulnerable flanks, for all the
facts seem to point to a need for increased regulation. Nonetheless,
having been virtually self-regulating under impotent state commis-
210 See, eg., Memorandum of the Defense Research Institute's American Law Insti-
tute Committee Regarding the Restatements of the Law, 9 FoR THE DEFENSE insert be-
tween pp. 36-37 (1968).
211 See People ex rel. Barton v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 132 CaL. App. 2d
317, 282 P.2d 559, cert. denied, 350 US. 886 (1955); Baskin, Insurance Company Inter-
ference in Personal Injury Law Practice, 10 Cr~v.-MAuR. L. IEv. 42 (1961).
212 This is particularly so when courts refuse to permit prospective jurors to be
questioned concerning the extent to which they have been influenced by them. E.g.,
Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965). It has been suggested that insurers'
constant public decrials of fraud and high verdicts have made jurors more sensitive to
the relevance of insurance than would actually informing them about insurance in a
given case.
213 See KEEMON & O'CONNELL at 105; Moynihan, Changes for Automobile Claims?, in
CRisis 1, 2-3; Dukakis, Legislators Look at Proposed Changes, id. at 222, 227, 230; Scariano,
Remarks, id. at 236.




sions for years, the antitrust-exempt industry lashes out at anything
federal, apparently without recognition of the fact that the federally-
regulated industries also have for the most part come to regulate
their regulators. The real merits of federal as opposed to state regula-
tion never are reached; instead they are obscured in clouds of slo-
gans.
The same is true of other issues. The usual response of the in-
surers has not been to deal with the problems mentioned by their
critics, but shrilly to blame unscrupulous claimants' attorneys for all
of them and to press for retention of the status quo or for regression to
even more restrictive substantive and procedural rules. Proposals for
change "which spread the thesis of compensation regardless of fault"
are said to involve grave danger to "the morale, mores, and morals of
the people." 215 Texas newspapers in 1968 reported attacks by insurer
representatives on a proposal for mandatory uninsured motorist cover-
age on the ground, inter alia, of its unconstitutionality as a denial of
due process of law 216 Amazingly, its own self-interest so blinds the in-
dustry that it is virtually unable to recognize the validity of complaints
about its role in the claims system. At a recent conference on the
problems of insurance in which representatives of the industry par-
ticipated, the solution to the recognized "crisis in car insurance" most
favored by insurers was increased public relations or "education"
efforts, on the premise that aside from defects attributable to claimants'
attorneys and tort rules that promote claimants' awards unduly, all that
is wrong with the system is that the public is misinformed about it.217
But the industry does not put all its eggs in a single public rela-
tions basket. It also appeals directly to the selfish interest of the
attorneys who profit from the maintenance of the status quo. Both
claimants' and defendants' attorneys are warned that if drastic reforms
are made in the liability insurance industry the income of both groups
will be cut by as much as fifty per cent. Unfortunately this crass plea
strikes a very responsive chord from the bar, which professes to have
the interest of the public at heart while joining the propaganda of the
insurers.218 The ultimate threat is simply the collapse of the economy.
215 A defense bar organ appeals for the aid of "real lawyers" in defending fault
as a "religious and moral principle." Martin, 1968-the Year of the Plans, 10 Fo rTnm
DEFENSE 1 (1969).
216 See The Austin Texas Statesman, Nov. 2, 1968, at 34.
217 The Workshop Sessions: Summary Report, in Cassis 258, 272-73.
218 See, e.g., Defense Groups Support Adversary-Jury System, 9 FoR THE DEFENSE
57 (1968); Defense Lawyers Urge Retention of Fault System; Seek Industry Aid, Tim
NAT'L Um)ERwnsmR, Apr. 5, 1968, at 16.
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Referring to itself modestly as "the backbone of the economy" 219 and
"the indispensable industry,"220 the industry points out that it is re-
sponsible for assets of over 188.3 billion dollars and employs over 1.2
million people, and predicts "chaos" if it were to be abandoned 2 21
Some of the industry's arguments may be deserving of careful con-
sideration, but on the whole the industry does its public relations job
so badly that it actually reinforces the widely-held public opinion that
it is opposed to the public welfare, making it more difficult for im-
portant arguments to gain consideration. 222 The result is that the public
is unable properly to evaluate the role of liability insurance in the
system. Thus much insurers' propaganda can itself be seen as opposed
to the public interest.223
CONCLUSION
As we have seen, our claims system is not the familiar tort process
that is taught in the law schools and portrayed in the official mythology.
Apparently this disparity between myth and reality is due largely to
failure to recognize the ways in which liability insurance has changed
the system. Even those who recognize the importance of a changing
environment to law and legal institutions seem to have overlooked the
importance of insurance as an environmental factor. Unfortunately,
when insurance has been recognized as important, there has been an
219 Insurance-The Backbone of our Economy, 7 FoR TE DEFENSE 33 (1966).
220 7 FoR TEE DEFENSE 17 (1966).
221 Insurance, supra note 219, at 36.
222 The latest reaction of the Defense Research Institute to the problems of liability
for automobile accidents was to adopt a "positive action program" consisting of (1)
combatting abuse of contingent fees by claimants' attorneys, (2) supporting the Wisconsin
comparative negligence rule "where the [contributory negligence] rule is to be changed,"
"a matter for local determination," (3) approval of a highway safety program "through
concentration upon driver error" including wider recognition of the "safety belt de-
fense," (4) publicity to relieve such congestion as exists, (5) improved claims policies,
which includes: discouraging of false, exaggerated and nuisance claims; settlement based
on fault; consideration of methods of improving the utility of settlement discussions,
study of the use of the Ad Damnum clause "and its unwarranted impact on judgments
and interference with settlements"; discouraging legislation unfavorable to defense
interests; encouraging courts to be firmer in granting motions for summary judgments,
non-suits, and directed verdicts. 10 FoR THE DEFENSE 16, 19, 20 (Mar. 1969). In other
words, with the exception of a "local-option" concession to comparative negligence, not
one of the current complaints of abuses by the industry and by its lawyers was acknowl-
edged. One can only be amazed at such ostrich-like reactions.
223 This was the view taken by the State Insurance Commission of South Carolina,
which sought court authority to restrain insurers from issuing deceptive and misleading
propaganda on public issues affecting the industry.
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erroneous tendency to consider the presently existing insurance picture
as a static one, when in reality it is much more flexible and changeable
than the tort process to which it is joined.
It is not surprising that we find ourselves in this situation. Al-
though private enterprise knows full well its interests and has managed
rather well to continue to achieve higher profits, the tort process has
had only the most rudimentary mechanism-the common-law courts-
for ascertaining and articulating public interests in dealing with per-
sonal injury claims. We have seen the results. The system is dysfunc-
tional, even from the standpoint of the premium-paying insured; he
wants protection, while his insurer wants to save money. The insurer
is in a position to realize its interest, while the insured is largely
helpless. Naturally enough, the public doesn't understand this con-
flict.22 4
Even though our goals may not be clear to us, at least it is possible
for us to recognize elements of our claims system that could not possibly
serve public goals. We have seen ways in which liability insurance has
become so intimately intertwined with tort doctrine and tort procedure
that it seems impossible that reforms of either could be used to make
the system serve the public interest. Insurance is not as generally avail-
able to our citizenry as the system has assumed it is, and availability
vel non is determined not by public need but by insurers' determina-
tions of profitmaking potential. Coverage of various kinds of risky
activity is controlled by the same consideration. There is no reason to
suggest that the profit motive is an unworthy one in the context of the
dominant political and economic ideologies extant in the United
States today. The questionable thing is whether we can afford to let
profit subvert the public interest and defeat many of the basic assump-
tions of the pre-insurance or non-insurance tort process. 22 The effect
of insurance on the legal profession, for example, ought to be of
particular importance to us. It is clear that the profit motive has so
infected the personal injury bar and profession that the credibility of
the legal profession as an ethical and service-oriented social institu-
tion is becoming increasingly suspect. 226 The deluge of false and mis-
leading propaganda sponsored by the bar and the industry do not help
improve the image of either. We are therefore brought to considera-
tion of two questions. One question is whether we are prepared to
224 A recent conference participated in by industry representatives revealed a candid
awareness of the conflict and of public confusion. The Workshop Sessions: Summary
Report, in Ciusis 258.
225 Cf. Moynihan, Changes for Automobile Claims? Id. at 1, 8.
226 Id. at 9: "[T]he ethics of the American bar are at stake." See generally M. BLOOM,
THE TROUBLE Wrr LAwYEas 125-56 (1968).
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recognize our claims system for what it is and to live with it either
as it is or with modification. This is a much more realistic question
than whether we would willingly return to our system if we presently
were using another one.22 7 Secondly, unless we decide to reject the use
of private insurance entirely, we also will want to know what, if any-
thing, can be done to improve the claims system we have. Our previous
discussion here suggests a few conclusions, both negative and positive.
The most urgent necessity, it seems to me, is to face facts-to recognize
the system for what it is. Once we do that, we must by some means
decide on the social goals we wish a claims system to achieve and ask
whether the one we have is achieving or is capable of achieving them.
In this connection we must also decide explicitly whether the public
interest or the private interests of insurers are to predominate when they
are found to conflict, and we must decide on the means of resolving
such conflicts. Perhaps we will conclude that it is impossible to employ
private insurance consistently with the public interest.228
Just how these policy decisions are to be made is itself a problem.
Society traditionally has permitted a policy-making role to the common-
law courts, but as we have seen they seem not to have been outstand-
ingly successful in creating a workable claims system. This is almost
inevitable in view of the limitations of the litigation process as a means
of furnishing relevant policy-making data; intuition and ad hoc policy-
making may not suffice for such important decisions.229 More im-
portantly, because courts and insurers have become to some extent
partners in the system, the courts seem to have become incapable of
standing apart from the system, as it were, in order to evaluate the
relationship and the system. This is not to say that courts cannot make
decisions and changes regarding the claims system, even sound ones,
but simply that they are not the best equipped institutions to do so. The
job therefore should be left to the legislatures, if they will undertake
it, and to the courts only by default.
Regardless of who makes the policy decisions, it is difficult to
imagine anyone suggesting public maintenance of a personal injury
claims system that is not dedicated primarily to advancing the public
welfare. On this assumption, it is possible to exclude several possible
means of improving the system. One of these is the insurers' favorite:
227 See Pedrick, Tangential Introduction, in DELAY, DoLss AND THE AUTOMOBILE
Vicrim vii-xii (1968).
228 This possibility recently has been recognized in a personal injury organ. See
Consumer Takes Over Controls, TWIAL, Dec.-Jan., 1967-68, at 39. One Congressman has
proposed a form of federal government automobile insurance. Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1968,
at 11, col. 3.
229 See generally Roberts, Preliminary Notes Toward a Study of Judicial Notice, 52
CoarrEt L.Q. 210 (1967).
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improved and increased public relations.23 0 Nor do changes in tort
doctrine and procedure alone promise much improvement. The in-
surance industry is too flexible and the tort process is too rigid. In-
surance can adapt itself to any change in tort process, but the latter can-
not hope to meet every new tactic of the insurers.231 Plans, such as
Keeton-O'Connell, 232 that retain liability insurance as a partner free
to pursue its private interests are subject to the same objection.233 And
an additional objection is that the plans are easily subverted by claim-
ants' attorneys who want to bring tort law and insurance back into the
picture.
The most logical way of dealing with the problems created by
insurance would be complete and vigorous government regulation of
the industry. If liability insurance is to be permitted to participate in
and profit from our personal injury claims system, it seems both fair
and wise that we regulate it to ensure at the least that it does not impair
the public goals of the system and, preferably, that it helps to achieve
them. Of course, if the industry participates it should be adequately
compensated.2 34 This means that regulation of virtually every aspect of
the insurance industry would be required, including decisions regard-
ing who is to be insured, the terms of the insurance contract, including
coverage, rates, claims practice, the attorney-client relation, and per-
missible propaganda activity. Perhaps regulation could be used to main-
tain minimum standards, leaving improvement on them to competitive
forces. Because the complexities of doing interstate business require
more uniformity than state regulation by fifty states is likely to afford,
and also because of the traditional disproportionate political influence
of the insurance industry in most state governments, such regulation
probably would have to be at the federal level. 235 Like all centripetal
shifts of power, this one would have its regrettable aspects. No doubt
the necessity for any regulation is regrettable, particularly to the in-
dustry, but the need seems compelling. The industry has no legitimate
claim to a vested interest in the status quo. On the contrary, if govern-
mental regulation is in fact necessary, it is accurate to say that the
230 The Workshop Sessions: Summary Report, in CRusIs 258, 266, 272-73.
231 It has been pointed out by one who sees the need as reform of the legal system
that "[tjhe automobile insurance system can accommodate itself to whatever those laws
may be .... Mann, Remarks, in CRisis 113.
232 See generally KEErON & O'CONNELL. Cf. Conard, Live and Let Live: Justice in
Injury Reparation, 52 JUDICATURE 105 (1968).
233 Apparently the AIA non-fault plan does not retain liability insurance. See
materials cited, note 191 supra.
234 See Kimball, Automobile Accident Compensation Systems-Objectives and Per-
spectives, in Cisis 10, 22-23.
235 See Cahill, Auto Insurance-A Call for Public Dialogue, 1 CONN. L. Rav. 1,
6 (1968).
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industry has- "asked for it."236 At least it can find some comfort in
accepting regulation in light of other alternatives; probably the industry
would find regulation more tolerable than resort to social insurance.2 37
A regulated liability insurance industry, as I envision it, would be
an industry devoted primarily to service of the public interest with
profit secondary, in the theoretical model of a private monopoly. Since
it would be joined to a tort process having the same primary public
welfare ends, the union would no longer be a miscegenetic one, and
some of the built-in conflicts could be expected to disappear. Regula-
tion would not guarantee perfection, of course. But unlike the present
system, a system incorporating a regulated insurance industry would
be one in which at least changes in tort doctrine and procedure could
be considered without the confusion of selfish propaganda, and once
made could be employed with some hope of success in achieving social
goals. Regulation is also superior to most reform plans because it does
not, as they do, require virtual abandonment either of the tort process
or of the industry itself, with the political, emotional, and economic
difficulties that necessarily would attend efforts to do so.238
I do not expect the industry as a whole to greet the modest sug-
gestion of increased regulation with greater enthusiasm than it has
other proposals that interfere with its ability to make money in any
way it pleases. But the adoption of a non-fault insurance plan in
Puerto Rico 239 and the proposal for a shift to accident insurance by a
substantial segment of the industry2 0 are indications that the winds
of change will soon be upon the insurance industry.
If the liability insurance industry is worth saving, it may be well-
advised not only to refrain from opposing regulation but also actively
to seek it at the earliest opportunity. If the tort system is worth saving,
regulation seems imperative.241
236 Maidenberg, Remarks, in Cusis 252, 253.
237 In his THE FoaRNsic LoTRrY, supra note 3, Terence Ison has made a very per-
suasive case for a social insurance solution to problems with the existing system. Ad-
mittedly, the difference between regulation and public ownership can be one of degree
alone; the point at which sufficient regulation is reached may also be the point at which
the industry becomes public rather than private. So regulation may not be a wholly
satisfactory escape from social insurance, if an escape is thought necessary or desirable.
238 Cf. CONARD, supra note 196.
239 52 JuDIcATuRE 127 (1968).
240 See materials cited in notes 182 & 183 supra; Bailey, Remarks, in Cpusis 197, 201.
241 At the time of this writing the Department of Transportation of the United
States government is engaged in a thoroughgoing study of accident compensation in-
surance systems, including fundamental re-evaluation and review of the role of effec-
tiveness of insurance and the existing law governing liability. The study is to culminate
with a report of findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the President and Con-
gress in the spring of 1970. Unless drastic changes in our claims system occur in the mean-
time, regulation such as that here suggested would not be a surprising recommendation.
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